This analogy between the cooperation and mutual faith that make possible the process of economic distribution and the various manifestations of mind involved in the process of cosmic distribution is, in a sense, foreshadowed by classic identifications of God with love, harmony or justice.

In economics, value is based on the product plus the amount of process involved in making it available. In soterics it is based on the datum plus the divine process that makes it available for salvation.

The producer bases his action on the expectation that his products would be distributed. Does nature produce at random or only because it expects God to distribute its products? The idealist philosopher would not hesitate to represent nature as entirely motivated (and created?) by mind or God. My own notion is that the relationship between nature and God is analogous to that between body and mind as that relationship is interpreted by Dewey. He does away with the need for conceiving them dualistically.

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Saturday, August 23, 1941

One of the many reasons I am not satisfied with the way I spend the summers is that I then feel very keenly the lack of religious service both private and public. Not that I have ever participated in a religious service which has satisfied me fully, but I prefer any kind of service to none at all. This led me last Saturday to attend services at Camp Deal. Originally that camp was known as the Rabbi Jacob Joseph School Camp and was conducted mainly for children who attended that school. But for the last few years it has been known as Camp Deal and has been serving a number of the Jewish parochial schools in New York. The poor children of those schools are given two weeks of camp life without any charge whatever.

The religious services are orthodox. On the Sabbath they are divided into two parts. The second part begins at 11:00 with the reading of the Torah. The camp is about a 12 minute walk from where we live here. Lena and I got there on time. We ~~xx~~ were the only outsiders. During the reading of the Torah there were about 80 of the older children present. When the reading was over 40 additional children joined the service. They were the youngest group. Rabbi Nissenbaum who has charge of the services asked me to speak to the children. Although I hesitated to accept his invitation, because I had not spoken to children for over 30 years, I had no good reason for refusing and therefore yielded to his urging. The Sidrah was (p. 118) and I based my remarks on Deut. 8:2. I made the point that nothing good comes easily, elaborating somewhat the dictum I was happy I got myself to do what I really wanted, and the camp people were happy that I broke the monotony of their routine.

From Monday to Friday of last week Lena and I travelled in New England with Judith and Ira by automobile. Our terminus was the Young Judea Camp near Lake Babovsik in the S.E. part of New Hampshire not far from Milford and Amherst. That camp is run by the New England beanch of Young Judea. This year for the first time the four young people's groups -- Young Judea, Hadassah, Avukah and Massadah -- get together in a project to have 50 of their most promising members spend a ~~week~~ month in camp acquiring information and inspiration for their Zionist activities. To make this possible they secured the necessary funds from the senior Zionist organizations for scholarships to be offered to the 50 that would be chosen. The group is directed by Dr. Shlomo Bardin and Miss Gizzela Warburg.

Ira had been asked to give a talk on Jewish community life in America. His having to go there seemed to the four of us a good occasion to spend a few days travelling through New England, parts of which are reputed to be very beautiful. We started out Monday morning and stopped off for a while in N.Y. I had to be at the dentist's. We lunched at Steinberg's on Broadway and left N.Y. about 2:30. We arrived at Stockington, Mass about 5:30 where we put up for the night, because we saw that the play "The Male Animal" by Thurber was to be given there that night.

Although I had seen the play before I enjoyed seeing it a second time. One of the characters who is a satirical take off on a member of a College Board of Trustees refers to Roosevelt as the crazy man at the White House. This reference called forth considerable applause from the audience. So did a slighting reference later in the play to Secretary Ickes. Apparently the present Federal Administration is not in high favor with the New England Yankees.

Next day we travelled on to New Hampshire stopping over night at Keene. On the way we passed through Lenox where we visited the grounds in Bantling on which the Berkshire Music Festival had been given the previous three week ends, the campus of Williams College at Williamstown and the campus of Bennington College at Bennington, Vt. Looking at these places as an American I am filled with happiness and pride at the evidences of large scale cultural activity being carried on in this country. But looking at them as a Jew I am distressed, first because of the snobbishness and anti-Semitism which keep out so many of our deserving young people from these places, and secondly because of the devastating contrast presented by the poverty of Jewish cultural life. A third thought usually crops up at this point, and that is, regret for the cultural opportunities I missed when I was young.

At Keene we attended a typical summer theatre in a real barn where we saw "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The playing was amateurish, yet I was glad I saw the play because it gave me a chance to learn the story from beginning to end. This is typical of what I meant above when I wrote that I missed cultural opportunities. To read and master Uncle Tom's Cabin is as essential for the American consciousness as to read and master the book of Ruth is for the Jewish consciousness and yet my early training was such that I might use the phrase "growing up like Topsie" without realizing who Topsy was. Anyhow I am glad I saw "Uncle Tom's Cabin."

We got to the camp about 10:30 and were put up at a cabin about a mile away. In the evening the Institute was held in the bunk which served as a library during the day. In the dim light shed by a gasoline lamp Ira held forth. He spoke on the Reconstructionist plan for Jewish community life. After limiting the feasibility of such a plan to those Jews who believed in the need of perpetuating Jewish life and of operating for that purpose with the means we have now and shall have for the next two generation, he made the point that, to succeed, the project must be approached in a religious spirit. He defined that spirit as being an attitude of concern for the survival and growth of the Jewish people and the salvation of the individual Jew. The community could reckon with that concern in that it would do the following three things for the Jews: 1) it would give them status 2) it would foster among them the sense of mutual responsibility, and 3) it would give them a sense of permanence. After he was through he answered a number of questions and we broke up about 10:45.

RECONSTRUCTIONISM DEFINED

Next morning (Thursday) I gave a talk on Reconstructionism. The fact that I had come in the day before on the tail end of a talk that was being given by Dr. Blumenfeld of the Z.O.W. furnished me with an excellent clue for interpreting Reconstructionism. I heard him say that most of the Jews who have come to Palestine are merely refugees who have little or no understanding of Zionism, even if they have learned to speak Hebrew and have acquired a mere smattering of knowledge about Palestine. What the Jews need is not only transportation but also transformation. I used this last thought to point out that modernism (nationalism and secularism) has closed the frontier for Jews, whereas in the past they could transport themselves bag and baggage and carry on as before. For the Jews to survive they have to transform themselves. By this I mean they have to transform 1) their world outlook by synthesizing their tradition with reason, 2) their way of life by making the traditional way of life compatible with the kind of practicality and idealism (both ethical and esthetic) called for by modern conditions of living and 3) their social structure from the segregated ghetto life of the past into Palestine as the center and community, set up in the diaspora. The great advantage of the Reconstructionist plan blueprint (philosophy and program) is that it is the only logical and consistent one on the horizon. It does not call for compromises as do the Reform and Orthodox plans. An illustration of consistent Reform is Montefiore's and Lowe's "A Rabbinical Anthology" in which there is not a single mention of Palestine, and consistent Orthodoxy, the Aggudah attitude toward Judaism. But such consistency cannot appeal to a Zionist. Apropos of the question whether one can be an Orthodox Jew and a Reconstructionist my reply was that just as one can be an Orthodox Jew and a Zionist, as demonstrated by the Mizrachists, so can one be an Orthodox Jew and a

Reconstructionist. Consistency however calls for transforming our world outlook as well as way of life. Likewise it calls for acceptance of principle of unity in diversity. Neither is logically compatible with orthodoxy.

All in all I consider this last week a full and satisfying one despite my having done no reading or writing while I was away. It gave me the feel of a large part of the American landscape which contributed to the creation of the American consciousness, and it brought me into touch with a number of young people, most of them, I hope, non-professional Jews, who might carry on Jewish life of their own accord. Besides the experience of traveling in our own car with Ira at the wheel and Judith alongside him, the four of us all to ourselves for the greater part of four or five days was novel and exhilarating.

Anti-Semitism is the heir of Jew-hatred. It has inherited all of the prejudices and malice of its predecessor, but it has far outstripped its predecessor in venom and planful sadism, due to the operation of new political and economic factors that were absent in mere Jew-hatred. Jew-hatred fed on economic rivalry plus dislike of the unlike fanned into a flame by religious bigotry. On that state it existed until the advent of modernism in the end of the 18th century. Alongside the political changes that led to Jewish emancipation there were developing the forces of modern nationalism with its drive for cultural homogeneity and its imperialistic ambitions. In Germany when this drive and these ambitions were resisted by France and England, nationalism tended to become more self-conscious and fanatical. It had the backing of both the military clique and the philosophers. As a consequence German nationalism developed a keener sense of superiority and a faith in the divine election of the German people. The belief in Germany's destiny to rule the world became part of her national religion.

There was one obstacle in the way of Germany's achieving world hegemony, and that was the unwillingness of the rest of the world to submit to it. It was therefore necessary to find a way to persuade the rest of the world that it was to their interest to accept Germany's hegemony. That way was indicated by anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism virtually says to the world: If you will permit yourselves to live in the state of social chaos and disorder which your governments foster you will fall victim to the one ubiquitous menace which will undermine your existence -- the Jews. They constitute an international parasitic group which conspires to rule the world. The only way you can escape falling a victim to that menace is by recognizing in Germany your divinely appointed deliverer from your own internal chaos called democracy which is being exploited by the Jews for their own ends.

Thus in the same way as the Church found it to her interest to represent the Jews as the anti-Christ people which by the very doom that rested on it testified to the truth of the Christian gospel, Germany has sensed that she can best advance her cause and ingratiate herself with the other nations by displaying a concern for their welfare and warning them against the world conspiracy of the Jews. The ideology of anti-Semitism has therefore consisted in contradicting the high calibre of the German people, the supremacy of the Aryan race, with the alleged utter degeneracy of the Jews, and in placing as it were, before the nations the choice between being dominated by a superior race like the Germans and a depraved race like the Jews. The assumption in this ideology is that mankind must necessarily look to some superior people to set the standard in the art of living. In the past it was France or Britain. But now it is Germany's turn to function as the chosen people. But whichever people is destined to rule there is bound to be one people that must play the part of the devil, interfering with the smooth running of destiny's course and what people can that be other than the Jews?

This modern readaptation and reinterpretation of pre-modern Jew-hatred is indeed frightening. The more the nations suffer from their internal chaos, the more susceptible are they bound to be to the wiles of anti-Semitism, and the more likely are they to see in Germany's efficiency and success in eliminating the extremes of poverty, filth and disease proof of her claim to world hegemony. Only today I happened to read in the Reader's Digest a condensation of a popular current novel "This Above All" by Eric Knight. It is a story about a soldier, Clive Hanley, who having proved his heroic mettle in the retreat from Dunkerque decided to desert because he discovered that "we were being asked to die because other people had been blind and blundering and smug. He became aware that the entire government of Britain ever since the last war was "a series of governments internally hollow and externally vain and smug...sitting contentedly on an internal industrial and social schemo that has stunk of its own stagnation." I dread to think of how this just judgment on Britain is apt to augment the plain Englishman's admiration of Germany and consequently his accepting her interpretation of the Jews' part in the world as largely responsible for the inner rottenness of the democracies. The average Gentile is ½ as likely to fall for this way of accounting for the evils of which he is the victim as he was in the fourteenth century when Church leaders pointed to the Jews as having poisoned the wells and thus being the authors of the Black Plague.

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Sunday, August 24, 1941

About two weeks ago I discussed with Ira the question whether Reconstructionism should be the philosophy of a school of thought or the program of a party in Jewish life alongside the existing parties or denominations. We agreed that for the sake of clarity and effectiveness it is advisable to steer the movement in the direction of a

party rather than of a school. This led to my suggesting that we formulate once again the Guiding Principles of Reconstructionism. The following is the outcome of our discussions:

1. The Jewish people must preserve its historic sense of national solidarity, but it must reconstruct that solidarity to fit its need of being integrated into the life of other nations. To accomplish this the Jewish people must do the following:

a. Accept the state of dispersion among other nations as due to persist into the discernible future.

b. Reinterpret its nationhood so as to render it capable of being hyphenated with the nationhood of other peoples.

c. Continue the upbuilding of Palestine as its primary national task.

d. Deal with all problems of defense and relief in a spirit of mutual responsibility.

2. Religion is the element in Jewish life, which alone can give spiritual significance to Jewish nationhood and point the way to individual salvation. In order that it may function effectively religion must be constantly reinterpreted in the light of ever increasing knowledge of the truth, and enriched by the creation of new content and forms.

3. Judaism must make for preoccupation with the ethical aspect of all social relationship, especially the economic and the family, with a view to raising the ethical standards of Jewish and general life.

4. The form of Jewish organiaation in America should be the Federation of Jewish Communities, composed of democratically organized local communities of the various cities thoughout the land serving the physical, recreational, cultural and spiritual needs of their constituents. All activities of the Jewish community must be directed toward the twofold purpose of a) providing for the needs of the Jews, and b) perpetuating and enriching the distinctive life of the Jewish people.

Affiliation with one's local Jewish community must constitute an earnest of Jewish loyalty.

5. Jewish education must constitute a basic activity in the lives of Jews from their early childhood on. It should foster a knowledge and appreciation of the Jewish past, a sense of common destiny among all Jews and a desire to participate to the fullest degree in the present life of the Jewish people.

6. The arts constitute an indispensable means of Jewish self-expression and must be encouraged. The esthetic aspect of Judaism should include music, poetry, prose, drama, painting, dance, sculpture and architecture.

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Monday, August 25, 1941

I had expected to get through with my work on "Modern Tendencies in Judaism" by the end of the summer, and to resume my work on "Soterics." While I did considerable reading and writing on the former I cannot even dream of handing it in before devoting at least a year of continuous effort on it. I have written to Prof. Hayden asking him for an extension of time. So far I have not heard from him. In the meantime the beginning of the new academic year is approaching and I have to plan my courses at the Seminary. (It seems that I have to relinquish all hope of transferring to the JIR). I am very much attracted by the idea of using one of the hours to lecture on Soterics, and am therefore resuming my thinking about it.

The basic thought in soterics is that human life to be most abundant must be lived with from the standpoint of its needs, its form and its goal. These three standpoints yield three dimensions of values. The values of need are 1) health, 2) cooperation, 3) intelligence. The values of form are 1) utility, 2) goodness, 3) truth and beauty. The values of goal are 1) self-preservation, 2) humanity, 3) God.

Originally there was no division of labor and no differentiation of function in the fostering of values. Medicine man, judge, warrior, priest, prophet were at first probably all one. Even in the higher stages of culture, thinker, artist and saint were united in the same person. The complexity of life has necessitated attention to only one or another set of values. The dangers of the resulting disintegration are many. The spiritual leader must therefore make it his task not only to specialize in the values of life's goal, but must guard over the solidarity of human life by seeing to it that all values of life be organically coordinated.

The values of goal are the values of sanity. If regarded as belonging to a sphere that is superior to worldly cares they become empty and turn out to be a mere mask for egoism.

I would apply to intelligence what B. Croce says of historicism (the science of history) "Historicism," he says ("History" p. 67) cannot suffer beside itself or above itself either religious revelation, or the adoration of mystery, or agnosticism, each of which is incompatible with its being, for it recognizes no other revelation than that which thought gives to thought by means of criticism, no other mystery than the perpetual conquest of mystery by thought, no agnosticism save by way of convalescence from ignorance, and no reality beyond history which is absolute immanence."

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Tuesday, August 26, 1941

So long as authority was dominant in human life the final values or life goals were accepted uncritically. Now that we look only to "the revelation which thought gives to thought by means of criticism" (Croce) we must resort to some criterion that would help us determine the objective truth of the final values. Such a criterion presents

itself in the "cube" or "scheme of reference." The truth of the notions we have of self, humanity and God is tested by the extent to which they make possible the realization of the content and formal values.

Mankind went through a long development before it arrived at the age of maturity or criticism. At this point comes the story of the evolution of religion. The story must not confine itself to development in the conception of God; it should indicate the correlative development in the conception of self and humanity (or society). In this story the most radical break (which can hardly be said to have taken place on any recognizable scale) is the one which takes place when the individuality of self, of humanity and of God comes to be recognized not as monadic or as one of substance, but as historical in character i.e. as individuality of actions or process. It is only because their individuality is one of process or actions that they merge into one another, otherwise they would remain absolutely disparate.

Inadvertently I find myself agreeing with Fichte that God is not, as with Spinoza natura naturans, the eternal substance whence arises more geometrico through inner necessity all that constitutes reality, but ordo ordinans, the moral order, the goal or purpose which alone determines what is.

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Thursday, August 28, 1941

The fog of vagueness and confusion which envelops most of the affirmative concerning God and self would lift if we realized that the fundamental fallacy in our thinking about those two concepts is that we tend to treat them as subjects instead of as predicates. If instead of saying "God is one, omniscient, activity minus potentiality, omnipotent etc." the medievalist thinkers had said oneness is God, omniscience is God etc. their efforts to render existence intelligible

would take on meaning. Their way of stating their ideas seems on the whole either irrelevant because it is apparent that in their pretentious structures of reasoning they only arrive at conclusions which they implied in their very premises. They are the master violators of P. 124) principles. If we come to these concepts with a fresh and open mind -- which is something not even Descartes succeeded in doing, but which we will ultimately have to learn to do -- we cannot help noting that we have no direct knowledge either of self or of God. Since however we use these terms it can only be because we attach them to areas of immediate experience. The problem with which we should concern ourselves is: what is there to those areas of immediate experience that evoke from us the concepts self and God? But before we can answer that question we must have specific knowledge of the areas of immediate experience which evoke those concepts. Such knowledge if organized would give rise to the history of the God idea and of the idea of personality. Such a history however was impossible so long as men labored under the assumption that the God they knew and believed in was the only true God, while the gods that other men knew or believed in were either no gods or nonentities altogether. Its rise was further prevented by the medieval approach which departed from naive religion in deliberately making the idea of God the subject of all its judgments. By doing so it necessarily took pains to conceive God in accordance with what it regarded as absolute truth. It was therefore forced to treat all other notions as false. Naive religion claimed that the manifestations of divine power which its adherents experienced were without parallel, as did Jewish religion, Christianity and Islam. Such claim justifies the denial or disparagement of other gods as absolutely false. That was because naive religion identified certain specific beings as God, either YWH, Christ or Allah. Likewise Athenaton who identified the sun as the only god could well pronounce the other

deities illusory. But the philosophic conception of God differs radically from the naive conception in that it does not identify God with any one being. Whereas in all naive religion God is predicate, philosophy has tried to make God the subject. God is omnipotent, omniscient. The Shema reads "Yahwh is our God." The Israelites on Carmel cried out "Yahwh is God." Yahwh represented a definite area of experience for the Jews and Christ for the Christians. Each called his particular area of experience "God." But the philosopher or theologian treats the God concept as subject. In doing so he covertly identifies God with an area of experience. The moment he attaches a predicate to it, he merely brings out like the magician what he already has up his sleeve. It is this sleight of hand of the medieval thinker which has become boring now that we have become too mature to enjoy it.

One of the complicated problems in medieval theology is whether attributes may be ascribed to God. Some theologians held that concept attributes was compatible with the unity and (p.125)
of God. Others like Saadia, Moses ben Ezra etc. held that it was incompatible.

To understand what is back of that problem which in its present form sounds like a mere subject for a logomachy, we should translate it with the aid of the formula of inversion into the language of experience. The (p. 126) or those who favored the ascription of attributes to God were men like Ibn Gabirol and Nachmanides who were inclined to view some phases of human knowledge, will and even feeling as needing only to be extended ad infinitum or to be purged of their limitations to be regarded as worthy enough to con-

stitute ultimate reality, as good enough to make existence worthwhile, as transcendent enough to be God. On the other hand Saadia, Maimonides and the other negativists considered the fact or idea of transcendence itself as so basic to human life that they refused to put any limit to it. They reasoned (unconsciously) that to say "transcendent enough" is a paradox. They assumed that man could get the most out of life by assuming that nothing he did or knew or felt was good enough. That he must always aspire. This very lack of limitation was so significant that it was God.

The same method of inversion would put new meaning into most of the other problems of scholastic theology.

I realize that I have been as guilty as most people are when using traditional concepts, of limiting those concepts to their traditional meaning. I refer to my tendency to limit "theology" to scholastic theology and to define it as essentially the reconciliation of the religious tradition with aristotletian or platonic philosophy.

I was mistkaen when I wrote the foregoing note. As a matter of fact I have often referred to my attempt at reinterpreting the Jewish tradition as theology.

The emphasis upon transcendence, which characterizes both naive and philosophic conceptions of God, is motivated by the intuition that the life goals are never achieved, that they are always in advance of the actual however far the actual may be ahead of the past. The point that Niebuhr continually dwells on (one that I believe he took over from Barth)is that the ideals of ethics and religion can never be achieved in history. This according to him is the basis of the

sense of sin. We no sooner achieve in solving one problem than two arise in its place. This fact simply means that there are no limits to human growth or to the abundance of human life. Salvation is not static hence the power that makes for salvation is transcendent. This principle applies on a smaller scale to humanity as a whole and in toto to the self or personality of the individual, since both humanity and personality are the two life goals which with the life goal - God constitute in their dynamic attainment the criteria of salvation.

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Friday, August 29, 1941

An additional implication of the emphasis on transcendence may have been that the tendency to confine the range of final values to selfhood and humanhood must be resisted. This tendency would express itself in the past and is expressed to an even larger extent in the present by retaining the final value of godhood but so interpreting it as to identify it virtually with the values of selfhood and humanhood. In stressing the transcendence of God the ancients supplied a criterion which might help us to make sure that we are avoiding such identification. For so long as we remain within the fields of selfhood and humanhood we experience a sense of fixed horizon, which may breed either unwarranted optimism or unwarranted pessimism, depending on our temperament.

CORRECTION IN TERMINOLOGY

I am still wrestling with the problem of the terminology to be given to the different groups of values. Perhaps the following is an improvement on all of the preceding: 1) Content values divisible into a) satisfactions of physical hungers, b) satisfactions of social hungers c) satisfactions of mental hungers; 2) Formal values divisible into a) utility, b) goodness, c) truth and beauty; 3) Final values divisible into a) selfhood, b) humanhood, c) godhood.

It is evident that most normal activities participate in more than one group of content values. Play e.g. may satisfy 1a and b and to some extent also c. If it meets with b and c of 2 without clashing with 2a (by not taking up too much time) it is likely to receive the endorsement of values in group 3.

The difference between love and lust is apparent. Lust achieves perhaps 1a but lacks entirely 1b and gives rise to disvalues corresponding to 2b. All disvalues are such because they prevent values of the third group from emerging.

"What makes us so certain that it (democracy) could not function if it were ~~tired~~ tried? Probably three things: lack of faith in the common man, lack of belief that people could be deeply or effectively concerned with the common good, and third a sense that society could not be effectively planned without suppressing the liberty of individual living" Edman, Candle in the Dark, 67-8 . The foregoing, in the light of the soteric classification, implies that to despair of democracy means to have no faith in the reality or functioning of the life goals or final values. Lack of faith in the common man means seeing nothing in humanhood that distinguishes man from the beast. To assume that there can be no planned society without the suppression of the individual means that selfhood does not count. And to believe that people could not be "deeply or effectively concerned with the common good" amounts to the denial of godhood which we see at work when the individual genuinely transcends himself.

One of the purposes of a soterical classification should be to embrace and organize all the cultural forces from economics and art to religion and from law and ethics to education.

Another illustration of the tendency to transform the predicate into subject is the whole of angelogy. Never having seen angels what leads thinkers to make various affirmations about them? How do they know whether they consist of fiery substance or are true spirit, whether all angels are eternal or whether some are tempral etc.? The only answer is that after having formed in their minds the concept of beings that carry out God's will without the possibility of doing otherwise they attach to such concept the name angel.

It is quite apparent that Aristotle (De Anima III) in his famous definition of the soul: (p. 128) comes very near the conception of the self as a final value. Entelechy or perfection is the goal in which the value of anything attains its consummation. Aristotle is mistaken however in regarding the soul as the entelechy of the body. It is rather the entelechy of that complex of relationships social and mental which have the body as their center or frame of reference.

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Saturday, August 30, 1941

My own process of thinking about the problem of salvation is a good example of what mankind as a whole has been trying to do over a long period of years. It is a process of groping and fumbling, asserting and finding oneself mistaken, elating over a discovery and then realizing that it is only partially true and so on. Of one thing I am sure and that is that reading material which deals with life in abstract terms is more likely than not to permit me to go on in my own sweet way and to confirm me in my errors. For it is always easy to recast somebody else's abstract thinking into your own. But if I want to test the truth or relevance of my ideas on soterics I have to turn to reading material which gives concrete facts about life.

I no sooner turn to that kind of material than I find myself pulled up or reined in like a horse which tries to take a wrong turn. Neither Bergson's "Sources of Morality and Religion" nor Croces "History" nor Edman's "Candle in the Dark" into which I have been dippling of late, nor Schmidl's Survey of Med Jewish Philosophy on which I have been working, deepen or correct considerably my conclusions. But last night I happened to read three short pieces, the Readers' Digest condensations of Ch.A. Smart's "R.F.D," A. Carrel's "Man the Unknown" and "Dr. Austin Fox Reggs, A Portrait" by D. Ce. Peattie in the August Atlantic. These pieces helped to remind me that life is not made of classifications and abstract terms but abounds in hard realities like disease, suffering, fear, struggle, hardship, death. It is in the face of these grim realities that I am attempting some thing which can have value only insofar as it will help people to meet them and either overcome, transform or transcend them. The one thing I feel certain of is that I am on the right track in subordinating all values or all the human disciplines -- art, work, play, love, ethics and religion -- to the purpose of rendering life most abundant quantiatatively and qualitatively. The question is how to make a go of the classification arrived at, that is how to make it helpful in guiding and impelling us to render life more abundant.

The specific questions which the above mentioned reading material raises in my mind is: How can the soteric approach enable one to put up with the hardships of farm life like that described in R.F.D. or to face with courage dread disease as did Dr. Riggs when he discovered he had consumption and achieve the ability as he did to help others play their part in life no matter what happens? Of course these are only tame illustrations of what some human beings have to go through in life. Take the case of Rene Ballenoit the author of "Dry Guillotine." The raw deal he got from society and the herosim he displayed in his

struggle to reinstate himself are facts which ought to find a place in a system of soterics.

Or, how shall I fit into that system such conclusions as Carrel arrives at in "Man the Unknown?" "He (man)," says Carrel, "must strive against his fellow man or against himself. He is made for such an existence, just as the stomach is made for digesting food...Rougher conditions of existence and more responsibility would restore man's moral energy and audacity...He (man) must ascertain himself to dominate his hunger, his sexual impulses, his laziness, his fondness for alcohol, his need of sleep.

The individual and the race are weakened by extreme poverty. Wealth is just as dangerous. In the poor as well as in the rich leisure engenders degeneration...Two essential conditions for the progress of every individual are relative isolation and discipline. Work is more effective than alcohol and morphine in helping to bear adverse conditions. Inaction augments all suffering. Man is indelibly marked by prolonged and intense mental effort." (Reader's Digest Books 136-7)

If we go about constructing a system of soterics scientifically we must so formulate our conception of the final values -- self, humanity and God -- as to make them relevant to actualities and desiderata like the foregoing. They must not only endorse but also reenforce the desidarata.

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Sunday, August 31, 1941 FURTHER CORRECTION IN TERMINOLOGY

It seems strange that in the designation of the basic values in soterics I should have missed up on the proper designation of those values which correspond to efficient cause and that I should have called them "content" values. The content or material cause is represented in the system of values by the will to live life abundant

itself. That is the substance with which the other three causes operate. The efficient cause is thus represented by the fundamental hungers viz. physical, social and mental values. They should therefore be designated motive or motivating values.

Let me take the statement "Man must strive against his fellowman or against himself." The fundamental cause of man's striving is the need for satisfying his hungers. There is not enough in the environment to satisfy the hungers of all who happen to be in it. For human life to be possible at all some modus vivendi arises spontaneously among them. Any kind of modus vivendi, however primitive gives rise to form and goal values. These form and goal values reduce the extent of man's striving against his fellow-men and put in its place man's striving against himself. Man's appetites are unlimited. Any kind of modus vivendi calls for self-discipline. But there is a point beyond which one cannot carry this self-discipline or striving against oneself. When that point is reached the human being either resorts to one or two reactions or he disintegrates, i.e. dies either slowly or suddnely or commits suicide. The two reactions are 1) he either readjusts his formal and final values (his notions of utility, justice, rational i.e. the "ought" and his religious notions of self-hood, manhood and godhood) so as to push the point of endurance way beyond what it was before or he strives against those who possess what would satisfy his hunger.

A person who encounters physical difficulties or dangers which ordinarily he would regard as beyond his power to endure resorts to self discipline, i.e. strives against the pains and fears which those difficulties and dangers engender. By means of such self-discipline or striving he succeeds in pushing the point of endurance way beyond what it normally is. Thus Dr. Riggs (p. 129) was able to transform the adverse conditions in which disease had placed him into

means of self-help and help to others. He undoubtedly must have possessed a tremendous power of self-discipline. He sent in a specimen of his own together with that of a patient to learn whether his suspicions that he had contracted consumption was correct. That evening he was called to the phone; the voice from the laboratory told him that his own sample was positive. "Oh, yes," his wife heard him say calmly, "but what about that other specimen?" Yet even the average person is capable of responding with some degree of increased self discipline under stress of adverse circumstances. The populations of bombed cities display powers of endurance and heroism one would never suspect the average person is capable of. The fact is that the human spirit acts very much like the human body. The following from Carrel is very significant: "There is a striking contrast between the durability of our body and the transitory character of its elements. Man is composed of a soft alterable matter, susceptible of disintegrating in a few hours. However he lasts longer than if made of steel. He accommodates himself much better than animals do to changing conditions, to physical, economic and social upheavals. Such endurance is due to the particular mode of activity of his tissues and humors. Instead of wearing out, the body changes. Our organs always improvise means of meeting every new situation. When skin, muscles, blood vessels or bones are injured the organism immediately adopts itself. Everything happens as if a series of measures were taken by the body in order to repair the damage" (Readers' Digest Books, 133-4). An analogous process takes place in the inner life. The fears aroused by want, disease, maltreatment are like the pains which accompany any physical injury. The inner life or the will to live activates the formal and final values to a degree where they stimulate self discipline and heighten the point of endurance in the individual.

Most of the teaching and writing deals, insofar as it has any moral or social significance, with people who either have succeeded through self-discipline to raise the point of endurance in deprivation, misery, physical suffering or social ostracism or have failed to evince the necessary strength of character to do so. That is, people who either succeeded or failed in activating the formal and final values.[1] But in modern times, due to the development of technology and the promise of much more as possible men have come to believe that too much is asked of the average person in the matter of self-discipline and needlessly so. Technology has made it unnecessary for the masses of human beings to live in hopeless poverty. Far from activating the formal and final values, hopeless poverty only leads to moral and spiritual deprivation. There may be a flare up of ideas about God and the hereafter, but they are sure to be superstition, i.e. in conflict with the formal values of reason and irrelevant to the formal values of goodness. Consequently the tendency of modern teaching and writing is to begin to take cognizance of the need of striving against those of our fellow men who are responsible for retarding the production and distribution of the means to the satisfaction of the physical, social and mental hungers. This tendency underlies the various efforts to plan economy, government and education.

But the mistake in most of the planning is in leaving out of account the formal and final values. The Marxian approach, at least as it is generally understood, would confine itself to the strategy of class struggle. It expects the formal and final values to take care of themselves because it regards them as on the whole ornamental. The truth, however, is that the human will to live must function in all of its aspects simultaneously. Hence no economy, government or education can be said to be planned unless it include the planned transformation of the formal and final values so that they might be in keeping with the

1. This is true practically all the books condensed in @Reader's Digest"

systematic meeting of the physical, cooperative and mental needs.

* * *

Monday, Sept. 1, 1941

Facts as subject matter of science are events in nature in general or in human life (which is a special department of nature) considered independenlty of their relation to maximum human welfare, salvation or life abundant. The ability to view events thus began to be exploited only since the Renaissance. Whether the men of the Renaissance learned this method of treating events from the early Greek scientists is problematic. Although the Alexandrinians and the early medieval Arabs got very far in their knowledge of fact, especially mathematics, they cannot be said (I believe) ever to have achieved the strictly scientific attitude which could view fact as in relation only to other facts and not to human interests.

While this ability to observe events and note their correlation with those that precede and follow them has opened up new worlds to man's view, and has enabled him to manipulate the forces of nature so that he can transform his environment by means of them, he cannot dispense with the consideration of the bearing which his enlarged vista and his power of transforming environment have on his welfare and his will to make the most of his life. (No matter how successful we might be in explaining psychologically and sociologically any philosophic system, we shall find that we cannot escape certain basic assumptions which underlies the scientific methodology. Morris Cohen in his "Reason and Nature" does not indicate whence these assumptions derive. I venture to suggest that they derive from the very nature of the elan vital or will to live. They are as Kant has indicated the "forms" of the mind. If this suggestion is correct, it follows that the elan vital is inherently the source of the fundamental laws of thought (reason and beauty) and morality (goodness). The mateiral which has hitherto dealt

dealt with these considerations is contained in religious and ethical traditions, in public opinion, in the codes of the various callings, etc. Most if not all of that material is a hodge-podge of traditional principles and prejudices plus ad hoc opinions which express purely arbitrary preferences. The scientific knowledge about the world and man has invalidated the bulk of traditional thinking concerning what constitutes making the most of one's life, but even more so concerning what one is to do to achieve that goal. Hence the necessity of bringing together into coherent and mutually supporting relation the outstanding values which govern human life, understanding by values the ideals, goods expectations which form part of our thinking about and striving for salvation or maximum human life.

Much has been said about this war being an ideological war. This does not preclude its being a struggle for power. Perhaps a correct way of putting the matter is to say: this is a struggle for power between two groups, which happen to possess diametrically opposed ideologies concerning the very nature of human welfare, salvation or the life abundant. The traditional ideology is based on the assumption that man represents a creation sui generis, and that all who belong to the human species are equally entitled to develop their inherent potentialities for life. The Nazi ideology regards man as carrying forward the struggle for existence on a level of more complex mentality and greater cunning than other animals. Life is a race and the race is to the strongest. The few who are dndowed by nature with greater ability to impose their will on others should rule and have their rule accepted by the many. Both ideologies maintain that they aim at achieving a maximum of life. But the traditional interpreation of maximum life is enabling as many as possible to survive and make the most out of their lives. The Nazi interpretation is reckoning with the natural differences

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among human beings permitting the natural born leaders to rule and preventing the weaker (i.e. those unable to impose their will on others) from using their numbers to assert themselves, thereby multiplying weakness. To be weak means to have less capacity for life, for the display and enjoyment of it. Hence the more of them that are encouraged to live, the less abundant must human life on the whole become.

There is no possible way of demonstrating objectively which conception of salvation is more likely to succeed or which is more in keeping with the nature of reality. The issue has to be fought out. The paradox from the traditional viewpoint is that the method of struggle has to be resorted to as a means of deciding the issue. This itself seems to confirm the Nazi ideology. But the answer is that the fact of having to resort to struggle does not prove the ideology to be correct. It only proves that mankind has not yet become completely humanized. Enough of the beast survives in man to necessitate resorting to conflict to decide what should have been decided by reason.

* * *

Wednesday, Sept. 3, 1941

We need a vision of life, a perspective on the values that will help us bring under control the child, the savage, the animal in us, that will prevent the emotional maladjustments and strains by integrating the raw materials of our personality (the motive values) into a stable and unified character. To succeed in this the vision of life must, as far as possible, include the values which the human tradition in general has achieved and that of the group to which the individual belongs. in order to reenforce his faith in the final values, especially those of humanity and God. As a matter of fact the tradition of one's own group is the very starting point in any education of the child. In order not to create inner conflicts for the child when he begins to mature, it is necessary to keep on reinterpreting the tradition of his group so as to

bring it in line with the growing experience of mankind. The less we have of teachers and spiritual guides (fashioners of public opinion and pastors of the soul) to prevent those inner maladjustments, the more we shall have to depend upon psychiatrists to cure them.

The final values or supreme loyalties about which we have to organize all human goods are personality (or selfhood), humanity and God. They are virtually the same as those which Kant names as the highest values of life: immortality, freedom, God. The notion of immortality implies the permanent reality of the individual as a person: "freedom" implies the objective reality of that which differentiates the human from the sub-human being, for in contrast with the latter which acts without choice, man can choose because he is conscious of difference between disvalues and values, between lower and higher values. These final values constitute the best which Felix Adler advises us to elicit them from ourselves by eliciting them from others.

Personality or selfhood isnot merely the sum of forces that operate in the body of the individual nor is it merely the entelechy (perfection) of the body. It is rather the interaction of those forces with the environment both natural and social. While it has points of reference it has no locus. Ontologically its functioning and continuance are inseparable from humanity and God. Hence, even after the individual dies his personality or more correctly the personality of which he was aware and through which he interacted with the environment survives so long as the human differentia and God survive, just as color survives the eye that beholds it.

God is the value of hope, expectation, faith, that what ought to be will be. To believe in God is not to despair. This business of writing "postscripts to despair" is all nonsense. It is like the fellow who wants to see how he looks after he has committed suicide. Bertrand Russll's advice "to build upon the firm foundation of despair" is a contradiction in adjectio. All life is fundamentally hope and expectation. It may be necessary soterically to extend the period which must pass before the Kingdom of God is established, just as it has been necessary to extend scientifically the period since when the earth has come into existance and man has been on the earth. It may be necessary soterically for the individual human being to learn to identify his personal fate with the fate of mankind, as we know historically that he identifies himself with his clan in his primitive days. But on whatever terms it be man cannot afford to abandon hope. Without hope or God life cannot be anything but hell.

It is not the function of soterics to solve all the perplexities and difficulties of life. The actual solution of the specific problems must be left to the individuals or the groups as they come to grips with the occasions that challenge their fortitude and faith. But a training in soterics is as necessary to them before they are confronted with such challenges as a training in mathematics is necessary to the engineer. Its task is to resolve all problems which have to do with making the most of our lives into their fundamental elements and to indicate the mutual relation among those elements, their comparative worth, and the means best calculated to bring them under harmonious control. Soterics disentangles all the goods, expectations and ideals from their context and orders them into a synthesis. It might well become the organon of values.

The definition of faith as "the substance of things hoped for" is in keeping with the soteric approach. It is not accidental that the attributes of God and the ethical qualities of man are designated in Hebrew as "Middot." They correspond to the formal values in soterics.

The very terms "final" or "goal" values or goods indicates that they are not achieved facts but to be sought after. They are glimpsed but not attained. They lie in the dim distance and can not be known except thourgh the intimations of faith.

The soterical approach does away largely with the question: which is prior, metaphysics or ethics because both are conceived integrally to each other, or more correctly stated because the only kind of metaphysics which can have a relation to ethics is that which deals with value. Such metaphysics, dealing with final values cannot be said either to precede or succeed ethics which deals with formal values because formal and final represent two different dimensions in values which are themselves three dimensional. There is accordingly as much sense in asking whether metaphysics precedes ethics or vice versa as to ask whether thickness preceds breadth or vice versa. For logical purposes breadth does precede tyickness but in nature the two occur simultaneously. Hence a statement like the following by Aldous Huxley which reflects popular belief is untenable: "It is in the light of our beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality that we formulate our conceptions of right and wrong. So far from being irrelevant, our metaphysical beliefs are the finally determining factors in all our actions_ (Means and Ends 11). According to Isaac Berkson (Educ 12) Huxley himself resorts to the opposite procedure. Berkson comes nearer the truth -- though even he misses the mark -- when he says: "A pattern for individual and social living

rather than a metaphysical theory of the nature of the universe must underlie a philosophy of education." A metaphysical theory of the nature of the universe usually means the metaphysics of being or ontology. That certainly can have no bearing either on education or ethics. But as for the metaphysics of value -- that is part and parcel of a pattern of social living (Cf. Havelock Ellis in "I Believe.")

* * *

Friday, September 5, 1941

The will-to-maximum life functions as hungers become self-aware. These hungers are not mutually independent but integral to one another. The process of self-awareness by noting the differences in the means of satisfying them creates the illusion of their being independent of one another. The means or conditions which satisfy any human hungers will be designated as "values" insofar as they contribute to maximum life and "disvalues" insofar as they frustrate the striving for maximum life. The means or conditions which satisfy the hereditary hungers for food, mating, shelter, gregariousness and mental activity are the motive values; those which satisfy the cultural hungers for utility, measure, guidance, beauty are formal values; and those which satisfy the cultural hungers for meaning and purpose to life are final values. Those means or conditions may be things, persosn, sensations, concepts or relationships. In common parlance they are spoken of as "having" value. Technically they may themselves be designated as values.

The final values constitute the invisible world which thinkers have tried to render either imaginable or at least capable of being matter for discourse by means of myths, symbols and doctrines. So long as one expeiences those values themselves, the myths, symbols and doctrines serve a useful purpose. It is then that we speak of religion as being genuine and vital. But the human mind is all too

often the victim of its tendency to have the word do serve for the thing, even where the thing can be experienced by the senses. All the more is that the case where the thing is purely an object of thought. When that happens with the final values, the myths, symbols and doctrines through which they became objects of discourse, are hypostatized and treated intellectually not so much for the purpose of recapturing the original experiences whence they arose, but mainly for the purpose of achieving an inner coherence or logical consistency This is the reason why to most of the theologies and religious philosophies seem little more than exercises in logic, where no attention is paid to the actuality of the premise, but where the main concern is that the conclusion shall not affirm or negate more than what the premise implies.

The soteric approach would justify itself, if it did nothing more than emphasize the interdepencence of the three sets of values. How necessary such emphasis is becomes apparent when we read a statement like the following: "The problem of the redistribution of wealth, however urgent, is not primarily a religious problem, and the Churches could not take it up without entering the arena of party strife and degenerating into secular institutions. The function of the Churches is primarily religious: they are concerned with spiritual values and not material goods, and regard life here as a stage to a life hereafter. From the spiritual point of view the gain of the whole world will not compensate a man for the loss of his soul. Religion has always a transcendant reference; and to abandon this and to preach a gospl of material well-being on earth would be fatal to religion." George Galloway, Principal and Primaries Professor of Divinity, St. Mary'sCollege, University of St. Andrews "Religion and Modern Thought" Edinburgh, 1922.

An interesting illustration of the tendency to disregard one or another set of values is that of the orthodox Muslims who contended that good is that which God commands and evil that which He forbids. "If God were tc command cannibalism it would be a good act." That is, for them the formal values were entirely absorbed by the final values. On the other hand the Mu'tazila believed in the absolute character of good and evil. "What makes an act good or bad is reason, and it is because an act is good that God commands it, and not the reverse." This proves that just as it is necessary to insist on the interdependence of the sets of values, it is necessary also to insist on their being dealt with in their own right. Nowadays, e.g. rationalists and esthetes and utilitarians (Marxists) deny the validity of the final values and consider the formal values as sufficient to enable man to achieve life abundant.

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Saturday, September 6, 1941

The nature of the conditions or means that satisfy the three types or hungers differs with each type. Those we designate motive values are tangible and visible; those we term formal or rational values are conceptually identifiable and communicable; those we call final are so immediate or unmeditated ashardly to be identifiable and communicable; ~~xhexexmexexxixxfixx~~ This explains why there can hardly be any controversies as to the kind of objects, conditions means or values that satisfy the basic hungers, why on the whole it is possible to agree concerning the conditions,means or values tht satisfy the basic hungers, why on the whole it is possible to agree concerning the conditions, means or values that can satisfy the hunger for appropriate form, and why it is so difficult even to define much less to get people to agree on what it is tht can satisfy the hunger for meaning and purpose. The fact that it is difficult or

well nigh impossible to identify and communicate formal values has led some to conclude that they are subjective, i.e. that they have no objective existence other than in the mind of the thinker. In that case they would differ little from illusions. That conclusion if accepted, would lead to [illegible] (p. 137?)

To overcome the difficulty of identifying and communicating the conditions and values that satisfy the hungers of purpose and meaning to life, men have resorted to a large variety of symbols, objects, myths, rituals and concepts. These objects, symbols, etc. instead of continuing to function as exploratory means of calling attention to the conditions and values necessary to satisfy the spiritual hungers, become ends in themselves and are mistaken for those conditions and values. This is the basis of all kinds of idolatry which impedes man's spiritual growth. Philosophers have been as guilty of idolatry as the rest of mankind. They have done with verbal concepts what the rest of mankind have done with images of wood and stone. We would have been much further advanced spiritually if the philosophers had concentrated on observing carefully what conditions give rise to the hunger for life goals, meaning and purpose, and what conditions (values) contribute to the satisfaction of those hungers.

To begin with the first final value to be studied in that way should be personality which is experienced as ego or I. The concept of soul was employed from earliest times to indicate the existence of personality. The tendency was to hypostatize that concept and to identify it as some imaginable entity. The notion of the soul as the body's double, consisting of a sort of gaseous substance, which can move into and out of the body is the one which has always prevailed and still does with most people. Many other fanciful notions have been extant. What is common to all of them is their identifying some imaginary space occupying physical substance which is finer than that

which meets the eye. In Aristotle we hear for the first (?) time a suggestion that the soul is not an entity at all but the entelechy (perfection) of the body. Once the philosopher emancipated us from the hypostatized notion of personality, we were on the way to the kind of study that would enble us to discover the actual conditions which had to be realized in order that we might experience the fulfilment of the hunger for personality as a final goal. Unfortunately the assumption that the soul is the entelchy of the body prevented the further pursuit of the study of personality from being as fruitful as it might have been. Actually the body figures only as the focus of a network of relationships. The entelchy or perfection of the entire network is the personality. Moreover by identifying as the human differentia (humanhood or humanity) the ability to think and express oneself in concepts and ideas, Aristotle like Plato before him further identified the soul or entelechy of the body as the abhievement of intellectual ability to grasp conceptual reality. In keeping with this high regard for conceptual thinking, God too was identified as the synthesis of known and the knowledge itself. Human experience has shown that the human being does not get very far in the attainment of maximum life by regarding the human differentia as consisting in the ability to think in concepts. Accordingly that ability cannot be the only condition or final value either of humanity, personlity or God.

When Descartes came along and decided to begin de novo by doubting everything, and returned to certainty by way of the forced syllogism "I think therefore I exist," he made the mistake of failing to consider the meaning or function of "I" in that statement. Does the term "I" in that sentence serve about the same purpose as "it" in the sentence "it rains," or does it refer to something more than would be indicated by saying "it thinks?" If the latter, what is that more?

With an ambiguity thus in the very start on the road to certainty, we are not likely to be successful in learning more about the final values as we proceed.

As the third group of motive values I have designated those which satisfy the mental hungers. Mental hunger might best be described as consisting in the desire to function, to be an efficient cause. As such it expresses itself in the craving for power to do things, to exercise control or to willed influence. The craving for knowledge is not an end in itself, although like all means it might become such, but initially knowledge is sought after because it is indispensable if one is to be an efficient cause in his world.

What is the relation of the elemental will-to-live to the will-to-maximum life? We read e.g. the story of "Two Survived" by Guy Pearce Jones (condensed in Readers'Digest Sept. 1941) about two sailors, 19 and 21, who together with five others escaped from the Anglo-Saxon when she was torpedoed. All the seven of whom some had been severely wounded drifted in an open boat on the high seas for about four weeks. By that time five were either crazed or weakened by their suffering and leaped overboard. The remaining two drifted on outliving 70 days of thirst, starvation and storm. This story is described as "inspiring us" with admiration for human valor." The admiration of valor is understandable only on the assumption that life as a whole takes on more meaning when the human being shows himself capable of going through such excrutiating ordeals only in order to live. We are therefore grateful to those who exhibit such valor because they prove that life is inherently so good and worthwhile that it deserves to elicit from us the utmost endurance we are capable of. The (p.139?) will-to-life is found mostly in those whom civilization has not rendered blase or life-weary. The spoilt children of civilization

are as a rule squeamish and ready to fling away their life at the least provocation, or would do so if they had the courage. What they need is to have some of that primitive will-to-live injected into them. The example of valor like that displayed by Captain Bligh and his men of the Bounty, or the two survivors of the British tramp steamer Anglo-Saxon (torpedoed on Wed. Aug. 21, 1940) might shame the civilized weaklings mong us.

This suggests that soterics has to concern itself not merely with the problem of will-to-man's life but also with the will to live as such. As human life grows in complexity and man gains in knowledge of his limitations and sensitiveness to so much that is wrong with the world he becomes pessimistic and begins to question the worthwhileness of life as such. Suffice it to mention Koheleth and Job. Even if those who live do not commit suicide as a result of their pessimism and despair, they harbor suicidal thoughts and refuse to bring children into the world. The menace of race suicide is one that hangs over the most civilized part of mankind and threatnes to further the survival of the intellectually and morally least fit. If the final values are to fulfil a vital function in life they must not merely hold up the goals which if realized would render life worthwhile, but they must also render those goals operative as a guarantee of the ultimate achievement of life's worthwhileness and thus reenforce the will to live in those in whom it might become enfeebled. It is at this point that the belief in God with its implied guarantee that what ought to be will ultimately be acts or should act as the principal means of reenforcing the will to live. Whereas the final values "self" and"humanity" function as means of furthering the abundance of life, the value "God" translates the will to maximum life into the maximum will to live.

In "This Above All" by Eric Knight (condensed in Readers' Digest Sept. 1941) Prudence (the heroine) passes through London streets while the bombardment from the air goes on and the fires are raging on every side. "She thought: Poor auxiliary firemen. Everyone joked about them -- but now they are not a joke any more. Poor me -- perhaps they'd been like her -- not knowing what they let themselves in for. You took an action -- one little action -- and after that life swept you away.

"Perhaps it would be good for them to be swept away -- torn from habit and routine. So many people tried to live in the back of life -- and life was really in the stream. Yes, that was life -- head over heels in the current, torn along trying to get breath."

Prudence knew there was to be a baby -- Chris' baby. "Without a father - like your father," she said. "But you're going to have a better time of it than he did. You're going to have a better England to live in...We have to fight now for what I believe in (England). And after that we'll fight for what he believed in (a better England.)"

The foregoing illustrates concretely what I mean by interpreting the belief in God as the augmentation of the will to live under circumstances calculated to prove life worthless and meaningless.

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Sunday, Sept. 7, 1941

The advantage of the soterical approach to the conception of God in contrast with the metaphysical becomes apparent when we utilize experiences like the following to illustrate the conditions which give rise to the hunger for God and the conditions which lead to its satisfaction. These illustrations aretaken from Readers' Digest, Sept. 1941 from short articles entitled

"Profit by My Experience." The first is "A Lesson from an Eskimo" by (p 140) author of Kabloona, the second "The Lesson of an Old Sock" by Vicki Baum.

Poncius was traveling with an Eskimo family to King Williams Land. What with the wind, the cold and the snow it was a tough trip. But he learned something about Eskimo mentality. Displaying impatience at being held up by a snowstorm he kept on asking the old man of the family when he thought they would reach their destination. The old man's replies were evasive "Don't the dogs go as well as you would like? Isn't that sled a good sled? Aren't you glad that the snow over the sea is lasting through our journey?" But Poncius read something different in the troubled eyes of the old man. He understood them to say "Why hurry and where is it that you are always wanting to be going? Why concern yourself with the future when the present is so magnificent?"

"The old man that day," writes Poncius, taught me a lesson which I have never forgotten. In my feverish thinking of tomorrow I had failed to appreciate today. In the old man's presence I remembered what some had said to me: "To think of the past is to regret it; to think of the future is to fear it." But the present! Is not that the only understandable reality? We rush along the highways of life ignoring the landscape. Someone said "Luxury consists in having time to spare." Time to stop and think? The Eskimos stop when they please. Though tomorrow holds for them, as for us, the eternal possibility of starvation and death. So death when it comes finds them still happy in the present. They go without regret."

Vicki Baum records the following: As a child she tried to learn to swim with the aid of a rope. When the rope broke she sank to the bottom of the pool. Everytime she went into the

water after that every muscle in her would stiffen. "Relax! Let yourself float" people shouted but no one told her how to relax. At the age of nine she learned to play the harp very well. But when she was put on the concert platform she became cramped with stage fright. Her teacher hissed "Keep your fingers loose! Relax." But she didn't know how to relax. By mere chance she learned what it meant to relax from a retired circus clown who would sit on a bench in the park she played in and feed the birds. One day she stumbled and fell. When Uncle Peter (the former clown) picked her up her knees were bleeding and her wrist was sprained. "You hurt yourself because you didn't know how to fall" he said. "That's the first thing you must learn in life: to fall without getting hurt. Fall from a chair, from a horse, from success. When I was no older than you I had fallen so often that almost every bone in my body had been broken. Then I learned to fall without breaking. I'll teach you."

Uncle Peter taught her the first tricks circus children learN; splits, flip-flops and saltos. "You could do them only if you were relaxed, but Uncle Peter didn't yell 'relax' as the others had done; he showed me how."

You are nothing but a soft, crumpled old sock" he explained. Get it? When you're an old sock you can fall and not feel it. Old socks can't get hurt and can't get broken. That's the whole secret. Now let's play old sock. Don't resist. All your body soft and floppy? No muscles stiff anywhere? With that he lifted me from the ground and dropped me. And I wasn't hurt. So I learned a lesson.

Later it became not only a physical but a mental discipline. Most people try to relax merely when restinb tu I learned that you also work best when you are relaxed. If I get stuck when writing

a story, or have forgotten something, I mentally turn myself into an old sock and everything straightens itself out. Whenever an ordeal is a bit too much for me, a too heavy lecture schedule, a loss, a danger, a pain, I apply the old sock technique, and I can 'take it'...I can picture myself in my dying hour, all relaxed and at peace, saying: "I'm only an old sock. Lord, take me away."

The life wisdom of the old eskimo as well as that of the ex clown expresses basic truths which are (p.141)
by the human will to live so long as it is unspoiled by the artificialities of civilization. One of the most ruinous artificialities consists in violating the law of polarity, i.e. treating the two poles of any given reality as though they were independent of each other, and cultivating one at the expense of the other. This is especially the case with "selfhood" and "godhood" which can function normally as final values only when they supplement, balance and correct each other all the time. Modern life, however, has attempted to treat "selfhood" as a complete value. This is evident in the straining after personal success, fame, power, happiness. Personality is regarded as most evident in those who are self-sufficient. This is one of the fundamental errors of modern secularism, which boasts of having discovered man the individual whose typical ideal is the strenuous life. Something must be fundamentally lacking in modern culture if two such distinguished products of it like Vicki and Poncius find themselves learning a most important lesson about life from illiterate and simple people. The truth is that the old eskimo and the ex clown retain the polarity "self-God" which properly marks human life in its striving to make the most of itself. What they have to say about being grateful for what the present offers and about adopting the sock technique as a method of living is nothing more than the picturesque application of what the traditional religions

have been saying concerning trust and faith in God. The tendency to forego the good of the moment out of eagerness to attain some hoped for good in the future is necessarily the result of keen consciusness of self in its desire to achieve, to be more than what it is. Traditional religion has been want to correct this tendency by insisting upon the practice of gratitude to God for what is enjoyed in the present. It has formulated numerous benedictions and doxologies for that purpose. Thus the God consciousness functions as a means of correcting the lengths to which preoccupation with the future might carry the self. Likewise is the case with the sock technique which, from a psychological standpoint is exactly what the pious person has always practised whenever he "committed his spirt" to God (p.142)

The psalmist did exactly what Uncle Peter advised. He relaxed, he let himself go, unlke the average adept of the strenuous life. Instead of stiffening himself into an attitude of resistance and combativeness against life, and cracking up as a result, he relaxed. The characteristic feeling for such relaxation is humility, acceptance without bitterness whatever befalls.

The manner in which a Sabbath should be observed, according to the teaching of traditional religion, rendered it an effective means of fostering an awareness of the pole of human existence named godhood, which supplemented the pole of selfhood, accented during the workdays of the week. For on the Sabbath both the grateful enjoyment of the present and complete spiritual relaxation were the order of the day.

Seldom did rebuke sting so keenly as did that which was administered to me a week ago. I went with the folks to Asbury Park to see the movie "Citizen Kane" (which I thought was a very poor picture despite the praise awarded to it by the critics.) While the picture was showing a large crowd gathered waiting to be admitted. Instead of keeping silent they made so much noise that it was impossible to follow the picture on the screen. When we came out there were many people gathered around a young man who apparently was the manager of the movie house taking him to task for permitting the waiting crowd to disturb those who were seated. Instead of acknowledging his mistake he seemed to pooh-pooh the complaints of those standing around him. ~~Their~~ This exasperated me and I began bawling him out. At this ~~re~~ he retorted "Take it easy mister, take it easy." That I should have become so excited over a trifling showed that I was inwardly taut instead of relaxed, which by this time I should have learned to be even over serious issues. (In the sitution described above p.102 I carried myself well because I was relaxed.)

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Tuesday, Sept. 9, 1941

Yesterday we left Deal and came back to the city.

Yesterday morning I met with the Seminary students to discuss with them the sermon themes for the High Holydays. Before dealing with sermons Wall rightly suggested tht the students report their experiences during the summer especially in the camps. Then began a tale of woe. The following is the substance of what those who spoke up had to say:

Wall: We who are about to enter the rabbinate find ourselves shut out from the rest of the world. Very few, if any of our people, show any interest in the problem of Judaism. Most don't even want to discuss it.

Kreitman: Councellors in the camp have not the least sensitivity even to world problems. "Why should I bother with problems which are forced on me" is the attitude taken. The youngsters don't even want to hear anti-Semitism discussed. They see no use to the synagogue. All they are interested in is a job and recreation.

Barish: Religion should scrutinize itself; people are dissatisfied with it. There must be something wrong with the way we teach it. In ancient times the prophets attended to that need. Ogburn in "Social Change" points out the need for bringing religion up to date.

Panitz: People are opposed not to religion but to the symbols and institutions of religion.

Vorspan: People find there are other ways of being religious than those demanded by tradition.

Gerstein: Niebuhr in "The Leaves etc." points out the need of rendering religious symbols awe inspiring.

Jack Cohen: What shall we worry about first, the survival of the Jewish people or the survival of the Jewish religion?

Davis: The reason Jews are negativistic in their attitude toward Jewish life and Jewish religion is that being a Jew is voluntary. Most Jews have not yet accepted Jewish life of their own volition. The experience with the Hebrew camp (in which there were about 40 children) show that if we aim at 100 per cent Jewish living with the limited group we get satisfactory results. (Similar reaction reported by Kieval.)

Mereminsky: Young people are not interested in any specifically Jewish problem, not even Zionism. They can be appealed to only from the standpoint of world problems.

Rabinowitz: If we would give meaning to the symbols of religion we would be listened to.

Szobel: We should limit ourselves in our efforts to those Jews who want to be Jews. Weizman should not be allowed to go to summer hotels to get money for Zionism from Jews who have no interest in Zion.

In my reply to the students I said: Davis touched upon the fundamental problem of Jewish life when he pointed to voluntarism as being the source of all our difficulties in getting Jews interested in JUDAISM. By right our rabbis and scholars ought to suppend for a time their studies and researches and concentrate on this problem which involves the complete remaking of our people. When the house is on fire it is silly to go on with putting away things in their places.

In the meantime the only way in which it is possible to go on teaching and preaching Judaism is to have a message, to be convinced that the symbols and institutions of Jewish life have meanings which are inherently interesting and inspiring. Once we ourselves have what to believe in as Jews no indifference or opposition is likely to discourage us.

This morning I met with a number of rabbis who are seminary graduates for the same purpose as I met with the students yesterday. The following were present: Eugene Kohn, Zeitlin, J. Miller, J.J. Newman, Jacob Friedman, Radin, Jacob and Lewis Grossman, Zimmerman, I. Hoffman, Ralph Simon, Chapman, Harry Halpern, I. Meyer, Abrams.

I proceeded at once to give them the outline of the sermon on Obeying God vs. Never Believing in Him. The discussion didn't add very much to what I told them. IN a little over an hour we

virtually exhausted all that could be said on the subject. By that time Newman challenged me to give them some idea for the second day. I had come prepared for a request for an encore. The second theme was "Contrition before jugment and gratitude for creation." This is interpreted by Niebuhr in Christian ? p.144 as confidence that life is evil in spite of its good and good in spite of its evil.

The session was mostly take and very little give. I have learned, however, not to expect too much from the men and to realize that if a dozen or so of them can get some of the more worthwhile in their audiences to discover that Judaism can be vital and relevant, the future of Jewish life might be rendered brighter.

The best suggestions as to what is implied in the final value "humanity" should come from the Humanist movement, since its purpose is to find in that value the raison d'etre for spiritual life. "If the loss of the belief in the traditional God," says James H. Lemba in The Humanist (Spring 1941) "involved necessarily the loss of the assurance that humanity is not merely a meaningless product of chance, its seriousness could hardly be denied. It need not be so, however. Most philosophers have maintained the spiritual meaning and value of life by conceiving the ultimate power as spiritual, even though they have rejected the conception of a God accessible to praise, thanksgiving and supplication...There is in all of us an impulse, an urge to improve things, to make them perfect insofar as we know the perfect. The urge is of the very essence of life as it appears in human nature...The most significant feature of the history of humanity is not quiescent adaptation to things as they are, but persistent creative endeavor; its most

destructive trait is expressed not by the word "adaptation" by by "creation." There is in all of us the tendency to transform not only our physical and social surroundings but also ourselves in such a way as to realize and enjoy what we regard as a better life. We conceive and seek to realize ideals characterized by the conserated terms "good, beautiful and true." We labor with endless ingenuity to build houses and to get food and clothing beyond our minimal requirements. We lift ourselves out of original ignorance and discover ways of transmitting to our descendants the knowledge and wisdom we have gained. We rear our children according to improved patterns, and seek forms of social organization favorable to their survival and continued progress. In short we are untiring in seeking to improve our surroundings and ourselves."

In the foregoing all the three sets of values, motivating, formal and final, are brought together into a synthesis. Only when he comes to the consideration of the final values he lumps them all into the value of "humanity." There is much that he includes in that value which would be better treated under "personality" and still more that belongs to the idea of God. But in making the differentia of humanity to consist in creativity instead of self-adjustment, Lemba seems to have touched the vital fact about the final value of humanity. Yet creativity is the very element which is common to humanity and God.

Soterics is a philosophy of life which attempts to view life comprehensively. It does not undertake to place itself outside life and experience for the sake of achieving such a view, as ancient philosophies of life seemed to do. It accepts the natural limitations of the human mind, which forever condemn us to remain within the sphere of human experience. Thus e.g. the religious

philosophers who claimed that they could prove the existence of God from the teleological trend of the universe spoke as though they could view that universe from some point that transcends it. Soterics however is contented to confine itself to purposive action in the level of human experience. It treats purposiveness in human action not as old-fashiond naturalism did, as illusory but as essential to human life as the conditions which satisfy the biological needs of man. What is said of humanism applies with even greater truth and consistency to soterics. "Humanism as a system of thought presuppose the universe as the given; man as organic to the universe; and knowledge as inferential, relative and instrumental. It postulates, or working principles are that the chief aim of the humanist enterprise is the effort to discover, invent and enhance ways of living that will meet human needs, that the most dependable procedure found thus far is that of the scientific method, and that the goal of human enterprise is a world community of free people cooperating for the common good." Curtis W. Reese in The Humanist, Spring 1941, p. 27-28.

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Thursday, Sept. 11, 1941

The basic values are those which satisfy the inborn needs. These needs are a) physical, b) social, and c) mental. The physical needs are for food, shelter, mating; the social needs are for love and cooperation; the mental needs are for security and power. Religions and philosophic systems in the past tended to disregard these inborn needs or to appreciate the significance of the basic values except for the purpose of suppressing them or at best bringing them under control. They did not realize that the formal and final values are without content and meaningless except as they refer to those basic needs and values. The state-

ment (p 146) Its not followed through). In modern times when these have come to their own, and their fundamental importance is recognized two misleading tendencies in dealing with them vitiate the beneficial effect of such recognition. One is to emphasixe one group or part of one group of these basic needs and values at the expense of the rest. The other is to treat them as exhaustive in the sense of leaving to formal and final values nothing more than an ornamental significance. Marx would have the meaning of human life revolve around the economic values or mode of production. Freud assigns that central significance to sex values. The sociologists, particularly of the French school, treat the second group of values as all important. Nietzsche and Alfred Adler each in his own way see human ofe in terms of the mental needs and values.

This evening I listened to another of President Roosevelt's historic addresses notifying the American people of the orders he has given the Navy to hunt down all submarines and sea raiders which threaten to interfere with the freedom of the seas. It served the kind of notice on the nazis which is tantamount to a declaration of war.

It seems that the divine dialectic which is implied in the story of the Exodus, where Pharoah has his heart hardened by God in order to make certain his destruction is being enacted on a world scale. We Jews ought to be proud of the fact that Hitler began his assault on humanity and all that spells a better future for it by singling us out first for destruction. He thereby indicated that we somehow typify everything that he heates. To be the object of Hitler's hatred is to be as the side of the good angels. Whether we like it or not history has put us Jews on the spot. We are thrust into the front lines of the forces defending

all that decent humanity holds dear. The union of isolationist intrigue and conspiracy with anti-Semitism should make us realize that we have been cast by a Power not ourselves for a part in history that fully entitles us to regard ourselves as a chosen nation -- provided we accept that part as such and live up to it. It is because we have so stupidly failed to grasp this truth and have even been recreant to it that I have been urging the elimination of the doctrine of divine election from our ritual. The fact that we are forced into playing arole which we don't understand or appreciate makes us play that role very badly and deprives us of the right to make statements which are consistent only with a joyous acceptance of that role.

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Saturday, Sept. 13, 1941

The second of the final values "humanity" is the human differentia. As one of the final values its existence cannot be demonstrated as following logically from the other value categories. This of course is also true of personality and God.

It is important to remember that each of the categories of being and potentiality has its own logic, and even if at times analogous, the differnt logical systems are incommensurate. On the other hand, despite their incommensurate character they are interrelated, and any change in the one system is inevitably reflected by some change in the other systems. The case of the relation among the different categories of value is analogous to the relation between the physio-chemical and the psychic. "When the energy we know as nervous is transformed and appears in the form of psychic phenomena, it from that moment follows its own laws just as in the hydroelectric plant the electric energy into which the hydrodynamic energy of the water is changed by the turbines obeys its own laws." What is true of the difference between nervous

energy and consciousness is likewise true of the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. In terms of values the difference is between motive values on the one hand and formal and final values on the other. The principle of incommensurability applies to that difference as to the one between nervous energy and psychic or mental energy (or consciousness).

In the light of the foregoing the value "humanity" means that self-consciousness is not reducible to consciousness but represents a new stage or level of existence.

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Monday, Sept. 15, 1941

One of the weirdest -- I can't think of any more expressive adjective -- experiences I have had in a long time has been the one I have lived through these last two days. Early Saturday morning Charles Cohen, the brother-in-law of Sam Lamport called me to tell me that Sam had died about 6:30 A.M. He wanted to know where I thought the funeral ought to take place. I suggested the Riverside Memorial Chapel. "Oh no" I hear May -Sam's wife - say to Charles Cohen, ~~&~~ it has to take place from the SAJ synagogue." I couldn't very well insist that the funeral take place in the Riverside Chapel so I referred him to Poses, the chairman of the Board. Right after that I got in touch with Poses and coached him to refuse permission of the use of the SAJ synagogue. When I came back from services - where I had some excitement about the Bar Mitzvah and the torn and filty Torah covering -- I was called up by Poses and Liebovitz, both of whom insisted that we allow the Lamports the use of the SAJ synagogue. I suggested to Poses that he get in touch with Joe Levy, hoping that Levy would insist that we refuse, but he too agreed with Leibovitz, despite the fact ~~that he had quite an altercation with Sam a few months ago.~~

all that decent humanity holds dear. The union of isolationist

Personally I did not think that it was right for the synagogue to be used for the funeral of a man who never entered it except for a short period on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Their argument on the other hand was that the Lamport family was entitled to the use of the synagogue because Sam had been one of the founders of the SAJ. I wasn't going to make an issue of the matter and I let them have their way. But if there were any standard which an SAJ had to live up to, such a thing would not have happened.

Then came the question of what to say at the funeral about Sam. He was buried today and I do not like to go into personalities about him, but he certainly was the last person in the world I wanted to deliver eulogies over. Like all distasteful ~~xxxx~~ tasks the one of preparing the talk kept on being put off until last night. I thought that after working about two hours I would succeed in formulating an idea that had come to my mind. When lo and behold, two hours and three hours and four hours went by without my being able to piece anything together. I finally went to bed after 1:30 virtually without the talk that I had to deliver at 2:30 this afternoon. When I got up this morning about 7:00 I worked for an hour on it and the fog began to clear. But I had to interrupt the work and go to the semnary to meet the students in a conference on the High Holiday sermons. When I came back I spent another hour on the talk and finally beat it into shape. But I was laboring all the time under a great strain. I knew that there would be a very large and distinguished attendance at the funeral. When I got to the synagogue long before the time scheduled I found it jammd. When I rose to speak I had complete control of myself and delivered an address which seemed to have proved quite acceptable. Everybody I met on the way back from the funeral, including (? p.148) Charles Cohen, children and many others, complimented me on having said

the right things without laying it on too thick or making use of any sob stuff. For the ordeal to have ended this way was certainly a relief which I celebrated by going to a show tonight. The show was "My Sister Eileen," a take off on Greenwich Village. I enjoyed it very much. For a while I FORGOT ABOUT funerals, salvation and the war.

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Tuesday, Sept. 16, 1941

Yesterday I met again with the students of the seminary and today with a number of the graduates to discuss the sermons for the coming High Holidays. I think that between 35 and 40 audiences totalling about 12000~~50~~ 15,000 people at least will be hearing in one form or another the ideas I suggested to the men. If ideas mean anything and their dissemination influences life, I cannot say that giving these men specific sermon suggestions is without value. Perhaps these suggestions will have a desirable effect on the men themselves. That of course would be heaven.

In discussing the Yom Kippur sermon today on the subject "What Makes the Jew Run" or "Refugees from Judaism" (which I had worked out in compliance with Artz's request to furnish the rabbis material for Seminary propaganda) I had occasion to state that the main emphasis in Reconstructionism is on the need of realizing tht we are confronted with the unprecedented task of having to live as Jews in a democratic environment on a voluntary basis and with the handicaps of an underprivileged group. The critics of Reconstructionism miss the point every time they take issue with one or another particular conception of God. I have tried again and again to indicate that while the belief in God is basic to the reconstruction of Jewish life, it is basic only insofar as its emotional and practical expressions are concerned. The cognitive or intellectual formulation is of secondary importance.

When I was through with the discussion of the sermon I reminded the men of what I had said to them when I met them before Shabuot about their ~~xxxxxxx~~ constituting themselves into a Reconstructionist Homiletic Club. A few voiced the usual objection to being labeled. But I insisted that a label like a name is essential in conveying briefly and quickly a whole pattern of ideas. If the ideas they take away from the discussions are to be effective they must be understood in the light of the entire pattern of Reconstructionist thinking.

Again the men wanted to know how far they had to subscribe to Reconstructionism to be considered Reconstructionists. I answere that the pamphlet "The Reconstructionist Movement" states specifically what one must accept to be a Reconstructionist. Anything beyond that in the expression of individual thought which does not commit the movement. I referred as illustrations to my idea of God, and of the divine election of Israel.

The following signed their names as members of a "Reconstructionist Homiletic Group:" Jacob Rudin, Lewis B. Grossman Joseph Miller, Morris B. Chalman, A. E. Michelson, H. J. Landau, Frank Zimmerman, Jacob B. Grossman, B. Leon Hurwitz, Abba Abrams. The following explained that they are not reddy to sign up, although they consider themselves Reconstructionists: Zeitlin, J. J. Neuman and Goldberg (of W. 93 St. syngogue). I. Hoffman happened to leave before the rest. But I am sure he would have signed his name. I am amazed at Landau's signing his name. He is in a strictly orthodox congregation and conducts his rabbinate in the old traditional fashion.

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Wednesday, Sept. 17, 1941

As I read in Windelband the summary of Augustine's philosophy I am amazed to find how much there is in common between the ideas on self and God I developed last summer (Cf. Vol IX of this Journal) and those taught by Augustine. Note e.g. the followng: "For so far as the comprehension of the divine essence is at all possible to man, it can be gained only after the anology of human self knowledge." (Windelband, p. 280) The very notinn of basing metaphysics on inner experience which Augustine was the first to attempt underlies the entire soeteric approach. Moreover his assigning to the will the position of primacy over the process of ideation and knowledge falls in very well with the will-to-live as the underlying principle which by self-differentition in consciousness operates as a system of those categories of causes. "Omnes nihil alind quam voluntates sunt" (Augustine quoted by W. p. 251)

A further parallel between my way of thinking and Augustine's is in the bifocal approach to Judaism as nationhood and a matter of salvation which approach correspondes to his emphasis on the Church on the one hand and on the immediate certainty of inner consciousness the individual mind on the other

But of course, I wouldn't want to be associated with any such insane doctrine as that of predestintion.

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Thursday, Sept. 18, 1941

If possible I should like to use one of the hours at the Seminary this coming year to lecture on Soterics. In order, however, to be able to do that I must begin arranging the material I have developed thus far into systematic form. I spent the greater part of today looking over my notes. The following is the order which I expect to follow:

In organizing soteries into a science I am using the term science in the sense of "a body of systematic and orderly thinking about a determinate subject matter" (R. S. Collingwood "Metaphysics" p. 4) The subject matter in this case will consist of the various ideas(pre-suppositions) concerning salvation

Historically those ideas were formulated at first in religious terms, later in gnomic and recently in pragmatic terms. The tendency has been to regard each successive set of terms as superceding the preceding. The truth is that they are mutually dependent and are meaningless without one another. This truth derives from the interrelation of the four types of causes named by Aristotle.

Theexposition of soterics may well follow the historic order.
I The meaning of God, Humanity and Personality and their mutual relationship.
II The meaning of utility, goodness, truth and beauty.
III The basic needs, physical, social, mental

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Friday, Sept. 19, 1941

The theological presupposition that God, to be God, must be absolutely perfect in all those attributes which are associated with him is I believe, a hangover from childhood. "To a little child the world looks absolute and perfect. His father and mother are omnipotent; there is no limitation he recognizes to the satisfaction of his desires. Magic and miracle are easy for him to believe because he lives in a world of magic. The child must needs have omnipotence to answer to his weakness; omniscience to answer his ignorance; perfection to meet his inadequacy. In like manner the fearful adult must have an infallible rule of life or guide to action and all powerful source of strength for his

reenforcement. As the child gains confience in himself his need for omni anything decreases; as he builds his security within himself through the events of his experience, he ceases to seek perfection outside himself or to demand it as a basis for his own action." (Solving Personal Problems by H.S. & G. L. Elliott, p. 32).

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Sunday, Sept. 21, 1941

Despite my temperamental dislike of Mortimer Adler and my suspicion that Sorokin is at heart a reactionary, I find both of their papers which they read at the Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion confirmation of the soteric approach which I am attempting to develop. Incidentally the very division of the subject matter of the conference into the categories of sceince, philosopyy and religion corresponds with the classification of values I am working with in soterics into the three categories: functional, formal and final. Sorokin's point that we are now living through the degenerative stage of sensate culture and that we are likely to enter "a neo ideational or what is his probable idealistic phase" trnaslated into soteric terms means that having concentrated of late on functional values and finding such concentration ruinous, we are likely to return on a higher level to formal (ideational) values and perhaps even final (idealistic) values.

Likewise Adler in charging the professors with being positivists or naturalists is charging them with treating the functional values as the only ones that matter from the standpoint of human welfare or salvation. He is right in taking them to task for discharing philosophy (formal values) as opinion and religion (final values) as superstition. He is right 100% right in pleading for a modern synthesis and in laying down the following priniciple:

"In order that every ~~ex~~ cultural good (i.e. the three categories of values. MMK) shall be preserved to the fulness of its own unique value, each must be recognized precisely for what it is, and according to its distinctive character it must be ordered to the others. Since in the world of values there is no order without hierarchy, science philosophy and religion can never be harmonized so long as they are asked to lie down together, but only when each is called upon to perform its proper function,whether tht be to serve or to rule" (Science, Philosophy, Religion,p. 130).

I must confess that when I heard Mortimer Adler read the eight propositions which he lays down about religion I was profoundly irritated by them, because I listened to them with the assumption that they were intended to justify his Thomist approach. In the light, however, of the soteric philosophy which I have been developing independely, I find myself forced to subscribe to every one of his eight propositions. Translated into soteric vocabulary those propositions would read as follows: 1) the acceptance of the final values involves accepting the values God and humanity (man's destiny). Such acceptance is not acquired in the same experientul fashion ("naturally") as is the acceptance of the motive and formal values. The latter kind of acceptance i usually termed natural knowledge. 2) Faith in the objectivity of the final values, which is the subject matter of sacred theology, is itself "a supernatural act of the human intellect and is thus a Divine gift." That is to say, being an ultimate pre-supposition of the will to life abundant it constitutes a revelation emanating directly from that will. Since that will is all we know of the self-differentiating source of our being and our knowing it must constitute for us God insofar as He functions through us.

(3) Because faith in the final values comes from the will-to-live life abundant, it is more certain than knowledge derived from the purely "natural" action of the human faculties. (4) This is merely the obverse of (3). (5) The pre-su½position concerning the final values which are the objects of faith are independent of the presuppositions concerning the formal values, which are the objects of reason. But this does not mean that the former presuppositions (theology) "can be speculatively developed" without the latter presuppositions (reason) serving the final values. (6) There can be no conflict between the two categories of presuppositions, "although theologians (who deal with final values) may correct the errors of the philosophers (who deal with formal values), just as philosophers can correct the errors of theologians who violate the autonomy of reason." (7) The study of final values is superior to the study of formal values both theoretically and practically: theoretically because it leads to more perfect knowledge of God and man, practically "because moral philosophy is insufficient to direct man to God as his last end. (8) Just as reason predicates one system of absolute pre-suppositions with regard to formal values "less or more adequately possessed by different men" so faith predicates one system of absolute presupposition with regard to final values, less or more adequately embodied in the existing diversity of creeds.

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Monday, Sept. 22, 1941

This morning at the first day Rosh Hashanah services I spoke on the subject: "To Believe in God is Not Enough." It was one of the most successful sermons I have given in a long time. The remarkable fact about it is that it was preceded by virtually three to four days of mental torture due to the strenuous effort to formulate the idea and to hold it in mind and to the general

atmosphere of complete religious apathy and antagonism to Jewish life which become particularly noticeable at this season of the year. Think e.g. of the teacher in the Hebrew school calls of twelve different parents to get them to send their children to religious school and not getting even one of them to register his child in the school. The haggling that goes on about the seats, although for the most part kept out of my sight, always has its repercussions which reach me somehow. And the services themselves. They are supposed to begin at 8:15 gut they don't actually start before 8:45 because there is no one to act as precentor. It is 11:00 with the synagogue only about half full and the Musaff service has to be begun. Those who came find difficulty in adjusting themselves to their surroundings or following the services. In the yards adjoining the synagogue builders and house repairers are banging away. For three hours I am on edge, wishing to God that I had been emancipated from the ordeal of having to preach before people so lackadaisical and undisciplined. And worst of all having to come before them with an idea about God so far removed from the conventional type of thinking. Why did I come with such an idea? For the simple reason that I could think of nothin else to preach. The idea evolved from what I had originally suggested to the Seminary students and graduates whom I had met in the course of the two weeks preceding Rosh Hashanah. When I gave them the outline of the Rosh Hashanah sermon I was sure I would b able to use it myself. But when I proceeded to write it out last Thursday I discovered that it would fall flat if I attempted to give it at the SAJ services. I then started to rethink the entire idea and finally worked out a conception of God as the collective mind of humanity. I drew analogy between the mind of the individual and the mind of humanity. I could not step half-way in this

conception of God but had to answer the question: what is the relation of God as the collective mind of humanity to nature? And I answered it for myself by saying that nature (all that was tangible or demonstrable) was the body of God, whereas the collective mind of humanity was the spirit of God. From this point on I developed the meaning of monotheism and of obeying God.

But how was I ever to get a heterogeneous crowd of Jews who come reluctantly to these services merely to discharge a duty imposed on them by habit, with no genuine interest in problems of Judaism or of religion in general to follow me in developing so abstruse an arguemtn? Of course I related the argument to the present crisis, but even that I was afraid would not help. They would be interested in what I had to say about the crisis, but not in the theological argument which alone gave point to what I had to say about the crisis.

All these thoughts ran through my mind before I went onto the pulpit. But once there all my apprehensions were scattered to the wind. I spoke with all the ease of a well prepared lesson in which I was thoroughly interested. I held the people spellbound for an hour and five minutes. Naturally I feel extremely good about it, especially when I realize how easily I might have made a mess of the entire effort, and that I succeeded in having so difficult a thought listened to with interest by everyone present.

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Tuesday, Sept. 23, 1941

I believe I now have the answer to the main question that has been troubling me with regard to Soterics. Assuming that the synoptic view which it affords of human values is sufficiently inclusive and supplies us with an ordered knowledge of those values,

how does it make for a more correct understanding of human nature and a more effective method of improving it? The answer it seems to me is the following: Soterics with its emphasis upon values as determining human conduct replaces the hitherto prevalent psychological assumption that human conduct is the resultant of the two sets of competing impulses which man has in common with the subhuman, viz. selfish oregoisitc and unselfish or social. This psychological assumption implies that the human being is born into the world with a set of ready-made and discreet impulses. This assumption has been further developed by the Freudian school of psychology. But more careful psychological as well as sociological study (including anthropological) has disproved the assumption of "discreet and underived" interests or impulses. The therapeutic work of the Freudians is the strongest refutation of the Freudian hypothesis that the primitive urges are retained by the Ego, where they are held in check by the super-ego or conscience. Had those urges been as deeply seated as the hypothesis assumes, no analysis could emancipate one from their power. The work "with" juvenile delinquents, family problems and the like shows that undesirable behavior and even criminal conduct can be modified in a manner which would hardly be possible were it the result of unborn and inevitable tendencies. The fundamental principle that personality is the product of the social environment and influences and that conduct is determined by the standards of the group to which one belongs should put an end to the notion that conduct is merely the resultant of conflict among inborn instincts or impulses.

But how does the complex of social influences operate on the individual? The answer is: through the medium of values. The social environment brings to bear its systems of standards (formal values) and life goals (final values) in terms of which it evaluates the objects necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the human being

(the physical, social and mental). Those terms constitute what it regards as salvation.

Accordingly when we find that human life is chaotic we must look for the seat of the trouble in the prevailing soterical approach. Reconstruction of human nature and society must begin with a reconstruction of the system of values underlying the prevailing culture and education. And in the life of the individual all personal growth or growth of personality means continuous process of reconstruction of the system of values by which one lives.

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Wednesday, Sept. 24, 1941

Using Collingwood's definition of science as a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject matter "I would divide the subject matter of human knowledge into pure science, empirical science and soterical science. Mathematics and logic belong to pure science. Physics, chemistry and the auantitative aspect of the biological sciences are empirical sciences. All other sciences which treat their subject matter from a qualitative aspect are soteric because the element of quality derives from the relation of phenomena to the human will to live in the maximum life.

The presence of the soteric factor in psychology justifies Otto Rank's apparently nihilistic attitude toward that science. He claims there is no science of psychology as such because the psychologist is necessarily determined in his approach to the study of human nature by the particular environment in which his thinking is done. The following summary of Otto Rank's position is given by H. S. Elliott:

"There is no discreption possible of man or of human behavior in general. All realistic psycholgies are to a large degree cultural psy

cultural psychologies. From this point of view he holds that Freudian psychology is a true description of the upper middle-class bourgeois individuals of the Victorian period, and particularly a true description of these persons in Roman Catholic Vienna; but it does not fit the person who has not come under those influences. On the other hand, Alfred Adler was a Socialist and was identified with the suppressed classes and his psychology is a true description of individuals or groups who are handicapped or discriminated against and who are seeking to overcome their inferior status. Thus from his point of view it is not possible to understand man as man, but only men or groups in relation to circumstances or culture." (Can Religious Education be Christian, p. 189).

It is impossible to discuss human behavior without evaluating it because the very adjective "human" implies evaluation. All evaluation means relating directly or indirectly any phenomenon to the will to salvation. But what salvation means is entirely the product of social environment. This applies to modern psychological interpretations of human nature as well as to the traditional theological interpretations.

Are we then to infer that there is no objective standard for salvation? No more than we should deny the concept "justice," because its application calls at times for seemingly contradictory ways of acting, depending upon the circumstances. We have to get used to realizing that relativity means a more accurate observation of the working of law and not a denial of law.

What the formal value of goodness is has by this time become quite clear. It is the synthesis of individuality and cooperation. Individuality stresses the inalienable worth of the individual,

cooperation stresses the imperative character of good will in human relations. It will take much suffering before this conception of good will sink into the consciousness of the average person. Yet that does not exempt the educator from utilzing his opportunity to combat "the wide spred and ruthless discriminations on the basis of race, religion, class and economic status, quite without reference to individual worth and the ruthless competition and devastating struggle between individuals and groups in social, economic and international relationships." He must realize that it is futile for him to ask people to develop the virtues of respect for personality and interest in the common welfare in a society where success and even the right to enough to live on have been dependent upon the opposite characteristics." He must therefore conceive his function as consisting primarily in reconstructing the values by which the activities of children and adults are governed in homes, schools, churches and shops and market places In fact unless the values in the shops and market places, in banks and offices are reconstructed, we cannot expect those in the more intimate groupings in the social order to undergo any change. The work of the educator must therefore address itself first and foremost to the reconstruction of the value upon which our entire economy is based. It is meaningless to decry the individualistic character of the formal education in the schools with its inculcation of the competitive instead of the cooperative spirit by means of prizes of grades, promotion, graduation honors and the like, so long as in the world of affairs competition is the order of the day. And what is true of the schools is true of the homes, the churches, the clubs, the play groups, the social affairs and national and international relations, they cannot have any different set of values from those that obtain in the factories and offices.

All education and above all religious education must be reconstructive of the values which govern human life. This means that "there must be a shift from the effort to help individuals as individuals to the enlistment of individuals in the reconstruction of the life of which they are a part" (Elliott, ibid 226). The soteric approach overcomes the difficulty presented by the fact that it is no less futile to expect that improved social arrangements would produce better individual human beings that improved individuals would bring about a better society. In concentrating on the problem of values it operates with a factor in human life in which both the individual and the social aspect function in integrated fashion.

Hermann Cohen said of the German war motives in the first World War "unser Sache ist rein, engelrein" (quoted by Rosenzweig in Em..... to his Letters). Henri Bergsen interpreted the war as a contest between matter and spirit, with Germany as the protagonist of matter. What a commentary on philosophy as a guide to the perplexed!

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Thursday, Sept. 25, 1941

We are certain to misinterpret any human problem or situation if we proceed from the assumption that one cateogry of values determines conduct more than another. Nor would it be correct to say that the three categories of values are equal in their determining influence. The truth is that the three categories of values are merely aspects of the same fact or situation; or to put it differently, no human fact or situation is taken fully into account if it is not viewed from the standpoing of the three categories of functional values, formal values and final values

The Marxists are wrong in maintaining that the functional values are the chief determinants. This is the mistake underlying economic determinism as a principle governing the interpretation of history. But insofar as they have directd attention to an aspect of values ignored formerly in the interpretation of history or in the consideration of the ethical and spiritual problems of human life they have rendered an indispensable service.

How do the values actually operate in the determination of individual conduct and in the establishment and maintenance of social institutions? It is highly important to envisage as vividly and concretely as possible the answers to these questions. The more effectively it is thus envisaged the more easilymay values be controlled with a view to salvation. To be controlled means to be either rejected or selected and placed in the hierarcy or pattern of values.

Values are products of social interaction. That is to say, whether an object shall be considered as satisfying a need, how much of that object is to be regarded as necessary, what should be done in case there is not enough of that object to go round, what is the ultimate good to be achieved through that object -- all these values are the result of human relations and interactions which attain a certain equilibrium through them. But in human relations and interactions some persons are necessarily mor influential than others. This means that the evaluation placed on objects from the standpoints of function, measure and goal are those articulated by the most influential individuals in the life of a group. What renders them influential? Native mental ability plus skills in organizing social force and in persuading others to accept their evaluations. Upon what are their own evaluations based? Upon their own functional, formal and final values.

The problem in society has ever been: how to have this prestige group concern its own set of values so that they may coincide with the set of values of the many? The tendency of course has always been for the prestige group to disregard the good of the many and to impose its own set of values as the one by which the rest of society should conduct itself. A time comes when this attitude of the prestige group results in so much misery that revolt breaks out and a change takes place in the system of values. But what most people overlook is that no system of values can operate without a prestige group. Hence the tendency to disregard the likely danger that the new prestige group is as likely to make its own set of values the measure of the common good instead of actually studying and reckoning conscientiously with the common good.

The part played by the prestige group in determining the pattern of values by which a people lives is of significance not only from the static standpoint but also from the dynamic. When a people comes in contact with other peoples and there takes place what is known as the diffusion of civilizations what really happens is an interchange of values. But which values of the alien civilization shall be found acceptable and which rejected is determined by the prestige group of the people that does the selecting or adotping. An interesting illustration of the diffusion of values and of the principles governing it is afforded by the different effect which contact with western civilization has had upon Japan from what it has had on China.

The following taken from the N.Y. Times report of the address delivered yesterday on the fiftieth anniversary of Chicago University by Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to this country, takes on new significance in the light of the foregoing analysis:

"When a nation borrowed from the culture of another nation, the borrowing was the result of choice bast on a felt need or desire for the new cultural form. However, cultural borrowing is never truly wholesale, but always graded and relative, every choice representing a selection from a thousand or a million things open to commerce and borrowing.

"This principle of 'relative, selected and graded borrowing'," he said, could be illustrated by hundreds of instances drawn from the history of cultural exchange between the East and the West. The West, for example, borrowd from China silk, porcelain and hundreds of other Chinese things such as the camelia, the gardenia, the wisteria, the ginko tree, the soya bean and tung oil. In every case real need was felt for a Chinese product for which no substitute was found. In its turn China freely borrowed from the West such things as Indian corn and quinine and such mechanical implements as the time clock and firearms. Similarly the European traders and Jesuit missionaries of the 16th and 17th centuries brought to China the new scientific knowledge of the Europe of the 16th century.

"The principles of gradéd and relative diffusim, however, can only operate," Dr. Hu stated, "when there is freedom of contact with new ideas and practices and freedom for the people to make the choice in accordance with their need or desire for the new culture. Whenever peoples are free to learn, to know and to choose, there is the natural phenomenon of selective diffusion. But whenever a people is denied this freedom of contact and choice, whenever a government or a class or a religious order has the power to decide for the people what to take and what not to take from a foreign civilization, the natural cultural diffusion becomes impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult. Cultural changes can be retarded or stopped by authoritarian prohibition and by artificial protection."

We have the strange spectacle" he said " of an unchanging Japan after seventy years of apparently the most rapid westernization. We have the equally strange spectacle of China being rapidly modernized and feeling quite at home in the modern world after many decades of apparent failure in modernization. The true explanation seems xxxxx to be that this unchanging Japan was the result of deliberate solidification of the more fundamental aspects of her medieval civilization in order to protect them from the perils of westernization...The Japanese leaders thought that they could build up a western war machine which should be made to serve as a protective wall behind which all the traditional values of Tukugawa Japan should be preserved unaltered. The result has been an effective protection and solidification of many fundamental institutions of medieval Japan -- the throne, the Shinto religion, the military caste, the worship of force and conquest, the family, the position of women --against the 'dangerous' contact and influence of the new ideas of the ever changing world. It is this deliberate protection that has made them 'immune to the dialectic play of deep lying evolutionary forces.

The same view also explains the history of modernization in China. While Japan's first successes in westernization were achieved under the leadership and control of her feudal-militaristic class, China has had to spend decades to remove the monarchy and bring about a political revolution as a precondition for her modernization. The political revolution was in every sense a social and cultural manipulation. In a country where there is no ruling class, the overthrow of the monarchy destroys the last possibility of a centralized control in social change and cultural transformation. It makes possible an atmosphere of free contact, free judgment and criticism, free appreciation, free advocacy and voluntary acceptance."

He then goes on to say that Japan which had been ruled by a military feudal oligarchy for centuries -- the caste of Daimyo and Samurrai - was at the height of this military feudalism when the western civilization knocked at her gates. This is why she found it easy to assimilate the militaristic phase of Europen civilixation in a few decades. On the other hand in China there had been going on for over twenty-one centuries a process of democratization of the social structure, through the breakdown of feudalism and abolition of primogenture, through an equal division of inherited property among sons, through twenty centuries of selection of men for public office by means of competitive examinations and through the age long philosophical and educational tradition which teaches in its sacred scriptures that "with education there is no class and that rebellion against tyrannical government is justifiable."

In other words when the prestige group is a military one it is certain to permit the diffusion only of those values which are certain to keep it in power. When, however, the prestige group is one of the morally educated, it is likely to make for the growth of democracy and to permit the diffusion of values in the interest of the many and not only in that of its own group.

The following conclusion drawn by Hu Shih is significant: "No government, no ruling class, no leadership, is wise enough or far sighted enough to do the choosing for the people and to artificially protect any part of its indigenous culture from the wholesale contact and even friction with new ideas and institutions of a larger world."

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Friday, Sept. 26, 1941

Is it too much to hope that I have at long last disentangled the knot of terminology in the system of Soterics? Henceforth, and let me hope finally, I shall employ the following terminology into which all that has gone before will have to be recast:

NEEDS AND VALUES

As human beings striving to make the most of our lives, i.e. to achieve salvation or life abundant, we experience three types of needs, viz: functional, formal and final. This experience conforms to the Aristotelian principle of four causes, the first or material cause being the will to live as such, the functional needs constituting the efficient cause, the formal and final heads constituting respectively the formal and final causes.

FUNCTIONAL, FORMAL, FINAL

Each life need has survived because there has been something to satisfy it. That which satisfies a need has or is value. There are therefore three categories of values to correspond to the three types of needs: functional values (this is the new term for what I have hitherto called variously "purposive values," "content values," "need values"), formal values and final values.

To achieve salvation we have to know clearly and reckon with all three categories of needs and their corresponding values. Both the knowledge and putting it into practical effect are determined by the social order or the political and economic setup, because that order or set up consists essentially in the allocation of power and prestige, and because those who possess power and prestige decide what is to constitute the system of values or pattern of salvation by which the society that defers to them shall live. There is no value to any pattern of salvation which lacks the support of the power-prestige class. If that class exercises its power, i.e.

promulgates the kind of values which benefit it to the disadvantage of the rest, there evolve new patterns of salvation. Some within the power-prestige class then adopt the new pattern of salvation and gather around them the malcontents with whose aid the old crew is removed with the aid either of new made law or of force. The notion of anarchism that the very existence of a power-prestige group to set the standards of values is superfluous and dispensable runs counter to the actual needs of human nature. The problem of civilization has been how to organize the political and economic set up so that those enjoying power and prestige would be compelled to know and further the true salvation (i.e. the functional, formal and final values) of the largest number possible, and not merely their own.

To begin with human beings, when they reach the stage of self-awareness, do not deliberately go about organizing political and economic institutions. They find them ready made. It is therefore perfectly natural that those institutions should be regarded as being of superhuman origin. The same applies to the class which possesses power-prestige. That power-prestige is sincerely considered by those who possess it as having been conferredon them by some divine being. Since what they say goes, it is even more natural that their subordinates should likewise subscribe to the belief that those in power have been placed there by some deity. Since there are two kinds of power to meet which man must be prepared if he is to survive, namely, demonic and human, the priest and the warrior emerge as those whose authority determines the pattern of salvation. 1 It is not long before these two types of leaders develop into rivals of each other. This is how there arises the long feud between church and state.

In the nature of the case the priest is bound to lose out, because the alleged demonic force cannot compete with the very tangible hostile forces of enemy tribes and peoples. This superiority of the warrior leads to the rise of feudalsm, and feudalism in turn to monarchy and despotism.

In a country like China where no single warrior group is able to assert itself over the other warrior groups, and where therefore the power equilibrim is maintained, the priest ~~xxx~~ class might have gained ascendency as it did in Europe, if like the priest class in Europe, it had evolved a strong relgious ideology and pattern of salvation. What happened was, however, that many would be priests turned moralists. Among them Confucius was the outstanding figure. Being learned in the classics became the chief qualification for government office. A new type of power prestige class arose, the pundit type.

In Europe first the commercial and later the industrial revolution brought to the front the capitalist class. The members of this class became the determinng influence in the pattern of salvation by which men have lived down to our own time and to a large extent still do. In displacing both the priest and the warrior type of power prestige they set up the systems of representative government. Theoretically that implied that the members of this class were willing to reckon with the true salvation of all citizens of the nation. But actually representative government succeeded in furthering the pattern of salvation chiefly of the capitalist group.

The present world disorder is due to the revolt of the masses against schemes of salvation which have met the needs only of the few. The Fascist-Nazi scheme and the Communist scheme represent two diametrically opposed methods of bringing to the fore the kind of power prestige group that would be compelled to further the salvation

of the masses. Democracy must likewise come forth with a definite scheme not only of salvation but also of social order, so that those who are in office or in whatever other position of power prestige be compelled by virtue of their position to advocate values that would meet not only their own needs and those of their hangers on, but of the people as a whole. The expectation that the tragic consequences of the Fascist and Communist social set-ups would increase men's faith in democracy is unwarranted. The most illusory promise of salvation has always been found to beguile men. So long as there are political and economic systems which promise salvation, democracy does not stand the ghost of a chance, unless it proceed to formulate a soteric plan and procedure of its own.

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Monday, Sept. 29, 1941

Yesterday I resumed teaching at the Teachers Institute. This marks the beginning of my thirty-third year in that institution.

In describing the nature of the course this year to the third year students taking Religion 7-8 I pointed out that it would deal with the reinterpretation of the values set forth in the Pentateuch. In order to illustrate the difference between interpretation and reinterpretation I made use of the following analogy: Interpretation seeks to get at the meaning which a text had for its author. It is therefore like exchanging bills of large denomination into money of small denomination of the same currency. Reinterpretation which seeks equivalents for the value of one pattern of thought or civilization in those of another pattern of thought or civilization is like exchanging those same bills for currency of an entirely different country. This analogy can be carried a step further. It is important for those who want to conserve the values of the old civilization to know and appreciate them in relation to that civilization in order to be sure of securing their equivalent value in the new civilization.

Tuesday, Sept. 30, 1941

In Egyptian mythology the most famous story is that which tells how Set the power of darkness and brother of Orisis slew ~~XXXXX~~ Orisis and scattered his body to the four winds, and how Isis went up and down the land gathering up limb by limb. Milton in Areopagetica applies this story to what he calls the "sad friends of truth" who in imitation of Isis are searching for its scattered fragments. In a sense Soterics is that ~~kind~~ kind of a search. Osiris was identified with the sun. He was the god of light, life and health. He was also representative of all the vissitudes of man. He thus symbolizes that reality of the will to salvation which has been fragmentized by the human mind and broken up into numberless abstractions. Soterics in imitation of Isis, is searching for all the ~~fxxgxxxxxxxx~~x fragmentary truths and endeavoring to reintegrate them into the will to salvation.

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Wednesday, October 1, 1941

The business of preaching is basically the attempt to justify God's ways to man. With life getting increasingly more difficult by reason of man's inhumanity to man, it becomes annually less easy to justify God's ways. The task of preparing the sermons for this time of year has come to be such a strain on me that I wish with all my being that I were relieved of it. But I am so entangled in responsibilities that such a consummation seems quite remote. The paradox of this annual ordeal is that the more effort Ira and I put into the sermons and the more effectively we preach the more devastating is the sense of frustration we are bound to look forward to because we are convinced of the futility of our most strenuous endeavors to make the least dent in the crust of apathy and indifference which covers Jewish life.

I preached today for one hour and 25 minutes on the subject

"What Makes Sammy Run." I had developed that subject in my discussions with the students and the Rabbis before Rosh Hashanah as a result of Arzt's suggestion that I prepare an outline of an appeal for the Seminary. As with the Rosh Hashanah sermon I found that I had to work it out on different lines for the services at the SAJ synagogue. The working out came very hard to me, but I was rewarded by a fluency and ease in the pulpit which I am sure were felt and enjoyed by the audience. Thank God that I am at least free from the sense of having given a poor performance. When that happens I am miserable for at least a week. It is probably the dread of aweeks' inner hell that drives me more than anything else to exert myself to the utmost before I go into the pulpit.

Tonight I went to see a movie showing the spirit of China in the face of Japan's barbaric onslaought known euphemistically as the "China Incident." There were also two shorts, one showing a famous gypsy dancer and the other Paderewski playing three well known pieces. Alongside the heroism displyed in the main picture and the art in the other two, I felt extremely humbled. The Jewish world with its chaos shrank into such mean proportions that we make ourselves ridiculous when we try to interpret it in those high sounding terms which abound in the Jewish tradition. In comparison with the awakening of China, a Jewish awakening even if it would take place, would be like the stirring of an ant colony. (p.163)

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Wednesday, Oct. 8, 1941

Fear is the painful expression of the will to live. The human being in whom the will to live becomes the will to life abundant, experiences fear at its painfluest.

Envy is a special form of fear, due to the fact that it arises out of the assumption that the satisfaction of the needs of others must lead to the deprivation of what could satisfy one's own needs.

Fear, since it implies conceiving a possibility of deprivation, necessarily accompanies all of the three categories of needs. But envy, which is limited to deprivation caused by some one else's satisfaction does not apply to formal and final needs.

The deprivation of the somatic needs are starvation and pain; those of the social needs are shame and neglect, those of the mental needs are frustration and boredom. The objects which cause these deprivations are the functional disvalues.

Pugnacity or aggressiveness is aroused by deprivation of whatever satisfies functional needs. It is aroused moreover not only by actual but also by the thought of possible deprivation, which means by fear and envy.

To say as Max Eastman and so many others that "contest forms a large part of what keeps mankind healthy and interested" is nonsense. It is like saying "disease is what keeps mankind healthy." The fear of deprivation is a necessary stimulus to activity, so long as the possibility of deprivation is an ever present fact. The main effort of civilization should be to reduce as much as possible the likelihood of deprivation. That is what socialism is attempting to do. Actually, that can apply only to those somatic needs which have reference to food and shelter. As for the other needs, there is little that can be done to eliminate fear, envy and combativeness without changing the values of life. But the notion that we have to make sure of retaining the element of contest and that "progress consists in elevating the level and humanizing the terms on which the vital contests are fougnt" is sheer drival.

When we speak of social needs we do not mean only the need of loving and being loved, or manifesting good will or being an object of good will. They also include the need for either dominance or submission. The need forregimentation and discipleship, for being led, conforming and belonging to is just as imperious as that for mastery and ordering about. Both of them exist simultaneously. The extent to which one or the other type of need shall prevail depends upon the place assigned to them by the formal values. Thrasymachus and Nietzsche ascribe greater significance to the needs for dominance. Traditional religion to the needs for subordination and discipleship. The preper evaluation would have to be based upon the affluation of the principle of polarity.

The following is an illustration of the soteric analysis:

Max Eastman in describing his mother, the first woman minister of the Congregational Church, says: "She believed in joy. She believed that God himself is joy -- a vast stream of joy surrounding all of us. And she believed that the secret of a joyous life is to be forever in a state of growth." (Readers Digest June 1941). To say of a person that he believes in joy means that he believes in the possibility of achieving self-fulfilment as within everybody's reach. That God himself is joy means that God is best identified as the Power making for salvation. That growth is the secret of a joyous life implies the identification of salvation with the actual experience of growth. All growth is growth in inter relationship and meaning. Soterically, growth means the process of approximation to a completed (165) of each value by all the other values in a fashion that makes for their complete realization. And when he goes on to say "what also made her unforgettable was the courage with which she carried into life whatever she believed." He implies that the formal and final

values were translated by her in terms of functional values. For the essence of courage is reckonging with the functional needs in accordance with formal and final values even at the expense of thos needs.

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Thursday, Oct. 9, 1941

Altogether too little attention is padd to the part that boredom plays in getting men and nations into mischief. Boredom is the state of mind produced by the lack of satisfying mental food. The mind needs activity which gives it opportunity to exercise its powers. Finding no legitimate or useful outlet for those powers, it turns to a destructive outlet. This is why I am inclined to agree with the following from Pierre Van Paasen's "That Day Done" p. 91: "There is an element of profound truth in the remark of a young officer I met in Amien's that wars are necessary because they save the people from mortal ennui. Georges BErnanos, in the maturity of his literary creativeness, abandoned his home in France to take up his abode on the pampas of Brazil, because he could not see his country devoured by ennui. He told me once that universal boredom was like a poisonous dust that you eat and drink and inhale with every breath. If a man does not fight it a single moment, it covers his face and his hands. Man must remain constantly on the move to avoid being covered by that rain of choking ashes. But where those philosophers err is their conception of war as the sole escape from ennui. [If the peoples can be xixx stirred to war, which is in the final analysis, but a sterile ideal, they can surely and much more easily be roused to life, to peace, to the fertile ideal of democracy. For that, no less sacrifice and struggle and heroism are necessary."]

Van Paasen must have napped while he wrote the sentences which I put in brackets. The importance of holding clearly in mind the proper relationship of formal to final values becomes evident when the issue of tradition vs. change arises. A striking illustration of that issue is the controversy between Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke. Paine's "Rights of Man" which is a refutation of Burke's "Reflections on the Revolution in France" ridicules Burke's claim that the 1688 statute which placed William and Mary on the throne of England bound posterity to the end of time. Says Paine "Every age and generation must be free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolvent of all tyrannies." It is only the consent of the living that enables laws made in a previous generation to remain in force. This line of argument was in answer to Burke's claim that the Englishmen's way of life was based on inherited rights. Englishmen had an hereditary crown, an hereditary peerage, a House of Commons and a people which had inherited privileges franchieses and liberties. Since Englishmen had inherited their freedom, they did not need to claim it on the basis of abstract principles such as the rights of man...

"Referring to Burke's argument as a case of 'darkness attempting to illuminate light," Paine in turn argued that the French Revolution preferred to take its stand in behalf of human rights not on musty records and moldy parchments, but on the authority of nature.. The English Revolution had been a revolution against men but the French had revolted against a system" (The last quotation beg. Englishmen, etc. is from Omnibook Magazine Sept. 1941)

It is a mistake to believe that the clash between them is not so much a clash of logic as a clash of temperaments. This is the way people have been in the habit of dismissing problems which belong to the logic of values instead of to the logic of facts. The difference between claiming the right to freedom on the basis of heredity and claiming it on the basis of "abstract principle," represents the difference between on the one hand disregarding the validity of formal values and relying entirely upon final values to determine the right and wrong of things, and on the other, reckoning with the validity of formal values. All life patterns that are based on authority imply that a thing or law is right or good because it is declared such by a higher authority, divine or human. Those which are based on reason do not necessarly spurn authority, but maintain that if authority which is acknowledged to be infallible commanded a law or way of life, it does so because of the inherent rightness or goodness of that law or way of life.

The distinction between formal and final values throws a new light on the relationship between nature and God, or between the natural and the divine. Natural is that aspect of reality which satisfies the need for formal values; divine or trans-natural (traditionally called super-natural) is that which satisfies the need for final values. God, humanity, personality (soul). The sense in which the term "nature" is used here is the one in which the ancients and the scholastics used it -- as synonimous with the essential character of anything as expressed in its entire history from its origin to its complete fulfilment -- and not as the moderns and the Romantics use it. In the former sense nature is interchangeable with reason not only as measure bur also as goal. That is why the Stoics who saw reason in nature identified nature with God.

"Walter Lippmann presents the ideal of a regenerate and mature personality as the one great end of all living. Self-respect and disinterested observation are made the supreme value...As long as we are true to the ideal of a cleansed and mature personality, we can look upon the universe as comedy or as high tragedy or just plain face," and still "affirm that it is what it is, and that the wise

man can enjoy it." In This description of L's philosophy in his "Preface to Morals," enables us to see at one glance that what Lippmann attempts is to reduce all final values to those of the self or personality. This mistake, as W$_e$man (The Issues of Life, p. 35) correctly points out, consists in failing to realize that to make the self or personality the one final goal of life is "to try to fashion the world into the likeness of our own desires and pre-established ideals, instead of making these conform to that objective order of existence and possibility which oonstitutes value." This is rightly characterized as immaturity.

The abundance which man's life can attain is due to his ability to conceive vast possibilities compared with which the given or the actual is of very minor significance. For his ability to so conceive these possibilities as to render them far more truly his habitat than the actual he is indebted to the following four attributes of his mind: 1) memory; 2) imagination; 3) power of abstraction; 4) transformation of the actual made possible by activating the other three powers. These three powers emancipate man from bondage to the immediate situation.

There is one important difference between the soteric approach and that of the Greek philosophers. They attempted to formulate a pattern of conduct on the basis of their own individual assumptions which they regarded as the assumptions of universal reason. They did not deem it necessary to explore their own religions and ethical tradition, although in all probability they utilized some of the basic im= plications of that tradition. The fifth century Greek dramatists may be credited with having attempted to utilize the religious tradition for the purpose of discovering new values to life. But neither their effort nor that of the philosophers had the desired effect on a large scale. Their achievements, it is true, did finally lead to a movement like Stoicism which had considerable influence on Roman law. But not before they were incorporated in Christianity and Mohammedism did they influence large masses of humanity.

At the present time any scientific attempt at transforming human conduct as soterics sets out to be must take into account the religious tradition of those whom it seeks to influence, whether it be Jewish or Christian. As an avowed

soteric scheme of life, by which people have lifed Judaism for the Jews and Christianity for the Christians must from the starting point of a modern soteric system. A soteric system cannot create patterns of conduct de novo. It presupposes not only definite habits and attitudes which constitute the material it needs to work on and with, but also the fact that those habits and attitudes imply the desire to make the most out of life. l In other words it presupposes a religious tradition. "Only when the present is integrated as one essential component in a vast structure of achievement which is continued from the past and reaches far into the future, can any great value be experienced."

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Friday, October 10, 1941

The formal values are truth, harmony, goodness and utility. As objects of the intermediate needs thye point to, the objects of the ultimate conflict among the functional needs, and the need which requires illusion or deciet is the more imperious one, due to heredity or to habit. As regards illusion the following from Wieman's "The Issues of Life" (p. 128) is apropos: "Here we have one of the most fundamental differences between men. On the one hand we have those who prefer reality to illusion no matter how sweet the illusion nor how bitter the reality. They have that kind of religion which seeks the best that reality has to offer. While this particular bit of reality may not be good, they know that if they play fast and loose with reality they never can follow it far enough and close enough to find the best that ever may be. This attitude implies that some form of the kind of reality which is not an illusion is the best that life can attain. On the other hand there are those who prefer illusion to reality. Their attitude implies that the best that ever may be is an illusion, although they may not consciously profess this...Which is right is perhaps a question that can never be conclusively demonstrated."

The will to make the most of life expresses itself as the will to activate all the potential energy that inheres in human life. One of the first effects of the awareness of the difference between will to live and will to maximum life is the

awareness that we possess more energy than we usually live on or exert. This awareness comes with the recollection of our having been able to do things under the stimulus of some fear or craving that we regard as beyond our power. Having experienced the greater output of energy than the usual, we begin to picture ourselves the employment of the potential energy we possess for the achievement of objectives which at the time seem remote. The mass of people, as a rule, seldom perceive more than a limited output of energy, easily forget such experience, to say nothing of their recognizing its significance. It is only the dynamic personality, who being endowed with more than the average portion of energy, that finds no rest until he discovers some outlet for it. In fact it is only that kind of personality that is responsible for substituting the will to maximum life for the will to live as the principle of human existence. He achieves that by reason of his need of others the moment he wants to activate his potential energy. Whatever objective or goal he sets up for himself usually requires the cooperation of his fellows. Possessing the gift for commercialism, he communicates to his fellows the desirability of the objective which he becomes aware of. His fellows, on the other hand, are at least amenable to communication. If they respond to what he communicates to them concerning the desirability of the objective, it is because they are capable of appreciating that desirability. In other words, that objective which is actually desirable for the dynamic person is potentially so far the average person. Thus impelled by incentives which are vividly envisaged by the dynamic person and awakened in the average person, human beings quest after the life abundant as they conceive it.

Unfortunately the incentives to the putting forth of greater energy which are envisaged by the dynamic persons and aroused in the average person are all too often of a kind which destroy not only greater potentialities of life, but even the actually existing sources of energy and incentives to its output. The traditional religions and philosophies have sought to counteract the setting up of arbitrarily chosen incentives, or stimuli to the evocation of potential energy, by setting up incentives which they regard as not only most potent in activating unused energy

but also as most certain to channel it into private and public conduct which is bound to lead to maximum life or life most abundant. So long as people accept the traditions without questioning, those traditions no doubt exercise a tremendous influence in activating potential energy and channeling it into conduct that leads to such salvation as is feasible at the time. As soon however as people question the tradition or the sincerity of those who mediate it, it begins to lend itself for purposes of camouflaging the arbitrary and sinister incentives which the dynamic persons begin to hold up and foster. Or, what is equally bad, the average person's life loses all plan and direction. It is then high time that the entire problem of salvation be overhauled. This is the situation in which we find ourselves at present.

What Weiman says about skill (The Issues of Life, pp. 110-11) belongs to the category of mental goods or values.

The importance of the final value "humanity" consists not only in the significance which it has when viewed intensively, but also in the significance which it has extensively. "Religion," says Wieman (The Issues of Life, p. 136) is reacting to something as though it were that to which all human life should be devoted. In tribal or national religions the human life that is thought to owe allegiance to this object of devotion is limited to the tribe or other group, but that is because such groups, at the time their religion arose, did not think people outside the group were human in just the same sense as the members of the group."

The relation of formal to final values is illustrated by Wieman's refutation of the banal argument advanced against the attempt to formulate the conception of God in keeping with our general philosophic outlook. It runs as follows: "I want a God with whom I can have fellowship, with whom I can share my sorrows and troubles as with a friend...If God is not a personality who can give me this kind of fellowship, he is nothing to me...Suppose one set up his uncultivated desires as standard for judging the literary ment of Shakespeare. He finds his neighbor's jingles more to his liking. Therefore these jingles are great literature, while the works of Shakespeare are not...The desires which can find satisfaction in the